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RÉSUMÉ 
Un des avantages les plus importants de l'utilisation du cloud computing est d'avoir des services 
sur demande, et donc la méthode de paiement dans l'environnement du cloud est de type payer 
selon l'utilisation (pay per use). Cette caractéristique introduit un nouveau type d'attaque de déni 
des services appelée déni économique de la durabilité (Economic Denial of Sustainability EDoS) 
où le client paie des montants supplémentaires au fournisseur du cloud à cause de l'attaque. Les 
attaques DDoS avec leur nouvelle version sont divisées en trois catégories: 
1) Les attaques de consommation de la bande passante.
2) Les attaques qui ciblent des applications spécifiques.
3) Les attaques d'épuisement sur la couche des connections.
Dans ce travail, nous avons proposé un nouveau modèle pour détecter précisément les différents 
types des attaques DDoS et EDoS en comparant le trafic et l'utilisation des ressources dans des 
situations normale et d'attaque. Des caractéristiques (features) qui sont liées au trafic et à 
l'utilisation des ressources dans le cas de chaque attaque ont été recueillies. Elles constituent les 
métriques de notre modèle de détection. Dans la conception de notre modèle, nous avons utilisé 
les caractéristiques liées à tous les 3 types d'attaques puisque les caractéristiques d'un type 
d'attaque jouent un rôle important pour détecter un autre type. En effet, pour trouver un point de 
changement dans l'utilisation des ressources et le comportement du trafic nous avons utilisé 
l'algorithme des sommes cumulées CUSUM. La précision de notre algorithme a ensuite été étudié 
en comparant sa performance avec celle d'un travail populaire précédent.  Le taux de détection du 
modele était élevé, Ce qui indique la haute précision de l'algorithme conçu . 
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ABSTRACT 
One of the most important benefits of using cloud computing is to have on-demand services; 
accordingly the method of payment in cloud environment is pay per use. This feature results in a 
new kind of DDOS attack called Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) in which the 
customer pays extra to the cloud provider because of the attack. DDoS attacks and a new version 
of these attacks which called EDoS attack are divided into three different categories: 1) 
Bandwidth–consuming attacks, 2) Attacks which target specific applications and 3) Connection–
layer exhaustion attacks. In this work we proposed a novel and inclusive model to precisely 
detect different types of DDoS and EDoS attacks by comparing the traffic and resource usage in 
normal and attack situations. Features which are related to traffic and resource usage in each 
attack were collected as the metrics of our detection model. In designing our model, we used the 
metrics related to all 3 types of attacks since features of one kind of attack play an important role 
to detect another type.  Moreover, to find a change point in resource usage and traffic behavior 
we used CUSUM algorithm. The accuracy of our algorithm was then investigated by comparing 
its performance with one of the popular previous works.  Achieving a higher rate of correct 
detection in our model proved the high accuracy of the designed algorithm. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is a revolutionary concept that has transformed the information and 
communication technology by delivering computational resources as services across the internet. 
Cloud computing provides inexpensive and scalable resources on demand to system requirement 
and consequently, there is no need to invest in a huge computer system.  
Users are not the owner of computing server. They can access to a numerous services without the 
infrastructure cloud management. Application and data are distributed in the cloud. Most of the 
time, the well connected servers allow the user to access the data only through a web browser.  
However, security is a big concern in this new technology. There are more systems to protect, 
more possible points of entry, more holes to patch and also more interconnection points in the 
cloud and accordingly the security in the cloud is more critical than old system [1] 
Denial of service (DOS) attack is a popular problem in network security. DOS attack increases 
the server load and makes the system out of reach[2].  The absolute prevention of the occurrence 
of Distributed Denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which are the most popular types of DoS 
attacks, is not possible; therefore, detecting these attacks is an important step in securing the 
server against this kind of very common security threat. 
According to the general definition of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), providing On-demand services is the most important benefit of using cloud computing  
[3] . It means that cloud customers don’t need to buy whole resources and infrastructure for the 
first time. The method of payment in cloud environment is pay per use  [4] . Based on this benefit 
of cloud computing, There is a specific type of DDoS attack specially designed for cloud 
computing environment which is called Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS)[5]. 
Every type of DoS attacks (or Distributed type of DoS) that happened in cloud computing and 
caused an economic problem can define as EDoS attack as well. 
In fact, there are two ways for implementing this kind of attack in cloud environment. In the first 
one, an attacker who is outside of the cloud performs and sends (D)DoS to a VM; while in the 
second one an attacker from inside of the cloud implements D(D)oS which means attacker uses a 
VM to send packets and attack to hypervisor or another VMs. But it is essential to note that in 
both types, attacker try to use of sharing resources to make all cloud become out of service it 
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means effect of this attack finally influence to hypervisor and eventually will be harm for all 
cloud. At the first glance it may look like that the attack is similar to a traditional attack (attack in 
non-virtualization environment) when we hypothesize that the attacker is outside of the cloud and 
victim is a server of a company that is in a VM; but in fact when a server is in VM, resources of 
this server are extendable and increasable. According to this fact every DDoS attacks in this 
server can change to EDoS attack that is a cloud special attack.  
Also on demand resources which is an important benefit of cloud computing, can be a big 
concern for the cloud because it can transfer an attack from VM to hypervisor. When a (D)Dos 
attack happens in VM, the resources of this virtual machine will be ended in a little time so VM 
wants to increase its resources to avoid being out of service; thus VM applies for more resources 
and sends this request to the hypervisor; by doing so, the attack is transmitted to the hypervisor, 
after a few minutes and accordingly using the live migration technique the entire cloud system 
will be crashed and become out of service. 
In this work we consider that virtual servers in cloud computing can be targeted by three general 
classes of attacks:  
1) Bandwidth– consuming attacks: This kind of attacks uses the total bandwidth of the target
with large volumes of data packets. It leads to denial of services because normal requests
cannot receive quick and operational responses [6]. In this work we use HTTP attack as a
good representative for the Bandwidth – Consuming EDoS.
2) Attacks that target specific applications: This kind of attacks targets a special application
in servers. In cloud computing environment each application can run in a virtual machine;
therefore, in an attack scenario, the attacker tries to harm servers by attacking the special
VM that includes special application. In our work we chose Database as the application
which is targeted by this type of attacks (Attacks that target specific applications). The
virtual machine allocated to Database receive many database queries for each HTTP
request in case of Database attacks [7, 8].
3) Connection–layer exhaustion attacks: This kind of attacks tries to use the protocol
features like Three-Way Handshake in TCP/IP protocol to attack the servers. TCP SYN
Flood, ICMP/ UDP flood attacks are examples of connection–layer exhaustion attacks.
Since these attacks happen at the time of making connection between client and server,
we called this category” connection-layer exhaustion attacks”. As a delegate for
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connection–layer exhaustion attacks at this work, we nominate TCP SYN Flood attack 
which is one of the most important issues in security aspect[2]; 
Our main contributionin in this work is to detect different types of DDoS and EDoS attacks in a 
framework which has not been considered in previous work. 
1.1 Motivation 
Since cloud environment is elastic and works based on the pay as you use model, additional 
resources are easily available; but the customer has to pay extra for them. Economic denial of 
sustainability is a scenario in which the customer pays extra to the cloud provider because of the 
attack. Also, because in this situation DDoS attack is transferred to the hypervisor, it can be 
dangerous for the hypervisor and finally for the entire cloud. 
The first prevention method that comes to mind is to limit the resource allocation[9]; however, by 
doing so we actually limit some of the most important advantages of the cloud computing . Thus, 
the absolute prevention of the occurrence of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and 
Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attacks in cloud computing is not possible; therefore, 
detecting these attacks is an important step in securing the cloud against this kind of very 
common security threat. 
The majority of existing algorithms for detection DDoS attacks in cloud computing environment 
work based on packet information; however, the packet in DDoS attack is like packet in normal 
situation and the only difference is that there are too many packets in DDoS attack; consequently 
the current packet based approaches are not reliable and powerful enough for DDoS detection.  
On the other hand, the present algorithms for EDoS attacks have mainly focused only on finding 
a solution for the defense and mitigation of EDoS attacks. Moreover, they are useful only for one 
attack and to our best knowledge there is not any global model to detect all types of EDOS. 
Therefore we decided to detect DDoS and EDoS attacks in cloud computing by working on 
traffic and resource usage anomaly detection.  
Our main idea for detecting these attacks is that, even if attackers in DDoS and EDoS attacks can 
make packets like normal packets but the traffic generated in DDOS attack isn't like traffic in 
normal situation. Also the proportion of resource usage is completly different in case of attack in 
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compare with normal situation. So we want to get some sample of traffic and resource usage in 
cloud computing servers and work on them to find a good approach to detect these 3 types of 
attacks (HTTP attack, Database attack and TCP SYN Flood attack). 
Thus our contributions in this work are as follow: 
1- Detecting DDoS and EDoS attacks by working on traffic and resource usages anomaly 
detection in cloud environment. 
2-  Introducing an inclusive algorithm which detects HTTP attack, Database attack and TCP 
SYN Flood attack no matter what time each attack happens. 
In chapter 3, we will explain our methodology in more detail. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
Our main goal in this work is to design and develop a model to detect different types of DDoS 
and EDoS attacks in the cloud computing. Our specific objectives are as follow: 
1. To extract information for the normal situation (traffic and resource).
2. To propose a module for sampling the traffic and resource
3. To identify the attack
4. To define the relevant metric for each attack
5. To  propose an algorithm for an abrupt change for the relevant metric
6. To develop detection method for different types of DDoS and EDoS attacks.
1.3 Thesis outline 
This thesis is organized in several chapters, the first chapter being this “Introduction. Chapter (2) 
presents the literature review and background, chapter (3) provides our methodology for 
Detecting Different Types of DDoS and EDoS attacks, chapter (4) provides results and discutions 
and finally chapter (5) discusses about Conclusion and future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
In this section we study the state of art research in cloud computing, its aspects, benefits and 
problems. Section (2.1) discusses about cloud computing, section (2.2) discusses type of 
virtualization that is one of the main concepts in cloud computing, section (2.3) provides some 
cloud standards, section (2.4) is about cloud security, section (2.5) discusses challenges in cloud 
security and some solutions for them, section (2.6) is a related work in detection and defense 
against DDOS and DOS attacks,we discuss related work in detection and defense against 
Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attacks in cloud computing in section (2.7) and finally 
section (2.8) introduces open problem.  
2.1 Cloud computing 
The concept of cloud computing was introduced for the first time in 1961 by John McCarthy[10] 
who predicted that the computers may eventually be organized in a way to be used as a general 
tool. After that, the telecom companies offered virtual private networks that significantly reduced 
the cost of service provision[4]. In 2007, large companies such as Amazon, Google, IBM and 
prestigious universities in the world began research projects in the field of cloud computing. In 
fact, the positive and striking features of cloud computing caused many large and reputable 
organizations to be turning to it.  
In this section we collect some definitions of cloud computing that each of them want to explain 
cloud computing.  
Buyya et al.,[11] have defined the cloud as a type of parallel and distributed system that consists 
of a set of virtual computers that as a single unit or multiple computational resources are 
presented. This definition is based on service level negotiated between service providers and 
consumers.  
Cohen believes that cloud computing is one of the achievements is trying to make progress in 
various aspects (load balancing - business models - models, architecture, etc.), as well as a new 
step in providing cloud computing software. For them, the simplest definition for cloud 
computing is a middle software for internet [1]. 
Kaplan believes that cloud computing is like the array of services in the web and its target is that 
applications achieve to large scale of the ability to make choices based on the “Pay-as-you-go “. 
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Cloud computing is an understanding of Utility computing without the technical complexities or 
concerns about the complexity extension on it [1].  
According to Sheynkman cloud computing focuses to make a layer over the hardware that can be 
used upon request. Many companies require hardware virtualization environment can be easily 
configured, deployed, to be managed dynamically expanded for take complete control of clouds 
and infrastructure applications [1].  
As it is clear in above paragraphs, a lot of definitions for cloud computing is presented by the 
authors, and there is still a debate and an uncertainty over the exact definition of cloud computing 
in industry. In January 2011 the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) offered a 
general definition “Cloud computing is a model that enables the on-demand network access to 
configurable computing resources at each site, appropriately” [3]. Networks, servers, storage 
sites, applications, and services can be examples of these resources. 
Today almost all enterprises consider the Cloud computing as a trend scenario and they try to 
make an entry in it. The benefits of utilizing cloud computing are[4]:  
I) Reduce the cost of equipment and maintenance.
II) Improve accessibility in worldwide.
III) Provide a flexible and highly automated process where there is no concern about software
up-gradation which tends to be a matter of every day.
IV) Payments based on scalability.
V) Using internet technology.
VI) Self-service based on demand of high performance.
VII) Rapid implementation, ease of maintenance and updates.
There are some drawbacks in using cloud computing as well. Recovering the data, lack of control 
over cloud services, service level agreements, legal problems, existing of different architectures, 
auditing, reviewing and evaluating the performance of cloud computing environment, are the 
major flaws in cloud computing[4]. 
The model that is provided by NIST is combining five essential characteristics, three service 
models and four models of deployment that are depicted in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure  2.1:The overall structure of the cloud as defined by NIST[12] 
There are four main models of cloud computing deployment in NIST definition; cloud services 
that we are going to mention them in next step can be deployed in four ways depending customer 
requirements, they also are mentioned Cloud computing variety in some of sources. Four main 
models of cloud computing deployment are as follow[4]: 
1) Public Cloud: in this model, a cloud infrastructure which is provided to many customers 
is organized by a third party[13]. Multiple enterprises are able to perform their tasks on 
the infrastructure simultaneously. Users dynamically supply their resources via the web 
from a service provider offsite. A waste of resources is chosen by the users and they pay 
based on their usage.  
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2) Private Cloud: a cloud infrastructure which is available only for a specific client and
organized by the company itself or a third party service provider[13]. It is based on the
concept of virtualized machines, and is an exclusive network.
3) Community cloud: an Infrastructure which is shared by several enterprises for a common
reason and can be organized by them or a third party service provider[14].
4) Hybrid Cloud: the composition of two or more cloud distribution patterns, linked in a
way to put together the transferred data without interfering with each other[15].
At a glance, a cloud must have the following five characteristics to be considered as a cloud[3]: 
 On demand self-service: cloud computing should work in base on “Pay-as-you-go“.
 Accessing the WAN: Permanent access to internet is one of the main requirements for
have a cloud computing. Since in some country some people don’t have permanent access
to high speed internet, it is possible that they have problem for migrate their services in to
cloud.
 Resource sharing (Sharing of pooled resource): split a physical computer into several
machines for economize especially in cost.
 Potential flexibility (Rapid elasticity): cloud should provide a flexible and highly
automated process where there is no concern about software up-gradation which tends to
be a matter of every day. Also cloud computing should have rapid implementation, ease
of maintenance and updates.
 A set of services (Metered Services): A cloud should have a set of service to provide to
customer, without services a cloud is meaningless.
Based upon the types of the services, three categories may be included in the cloud computing 
[12, 16] that you can see in Figure 2.2: 
1) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): The lowest level that provides basic support
infrastructure service. In order to control the creation and utilizing of virtual machines a
governance framework is required also in this category the unauthorized access to
sensitive information of the user is prevented. For example in Amazon Elastic Compute
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Cloud (Amazon EC2) provide VMs to their customer for using of resources. Amazon 
provides its customer with complete control of customer's computing resources[17]. 
2) Platform as a Service (PaaS): It is the intermediate layer and in addition to providing
environment to host user applications it provides services focused on the platform.
Microsoft azure is a platform for cloud computing systems. It is like an OS that allow to
customer to quickly build, deploy and manage applications[18].
3) Software as a Service (SaaS): It is the top layer that has a complete application offered
as a service on demand[19]. SaaS guarantees that the entire applications are hosted on the
web where the users utilize them. Payment is based on pay-per-use. In this category, there
is no need to install and run application on the local computer of the client, thus the
customer's responsibility for the maintenance of the software is remarkably reduced.
Google App, Facebook and Youtube are some example of SaaS that end users are
connects with them in cloud.
Figure  2.2:Cloud architecture[4] 
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2.2 Virtualization 
Virtualization is the main concept in the cloud computing. Virtualization is a method that splits a 
physical computer into several machines which are partly or completely isolated and generally 
known as virtual machines (VM) or guest machine [20]. Recently a lot of attention has been paid 
to the concept of virtualization as a crucial technology in terms of both academic and industrial 
applications. An outstanding example is the Xen virtualization systems that have been used by 
current market leader in the Amazon EC2 cloud computing to provide customers with computing 
resources. Using Virtualization the organizations can remarkably reduce the operational cost 
while still ensuring enhanced efficiency, boosted utilization and better flexibility of existing 
hardware. A Survey shows that virtual machines are being used in 90% of organizations in some 
capacity in their IT infrastructures[21]. A further 34% utilize the virtualization for the majority of 
their server requirements. Virtualization has been a fundamental concept in the recent years due 
to a huge rise of cloud computing in the modern era. The main issue is providing an environment 
that has the capability of rendering all the services to the end users, by support of a hardware 
which is observed on a personal computer. 
Virtualization is a concept that greatly attributes to the security implications in the environment. 
One of the most important components in Virtual Machines (VMs) is the hypervisor which is a 
piece of computer software, firmware or hardware that creates and runs virtual machines. In other 
words, hypervisor is a software layer that locates between the VMs and the physical hardware to 
implement the Virtualized environments, and to allocate resources to the VMs, such as main 
memory and peripherals [22]. The hypervisor or Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) can also act as 
a gatekeeper to the underlying hardware to improve performance isolation between guests on a 
host.  
The security requirements are much higher in virtualization due to the existence of more systems 
to protect, more possible points of entry, more holes to patch and also more interconnection 
points in the virtualized environment [23]. The majority of the new security protection programs 
that are being introduced to the market by different vendors are basically concentrated on 
hypervisor. Hypervisor is basically a software program and therefore similar to any software, it 
has all the traditional software bugs and the security weaknesses that are possible for any 
11 
 
software have these weaknesses. These are some reason that security in the virtual environment 
in more complex than a non-virtualization environment.  
There are different types of virtualization technology such as full virtualization, para 
virtualization, application virtualization, hardware support virtualization, resource virtualization 
and container virtualization that are explained below [24]: 
2.2.1 Full virtualization 
In this method, multiple logical instances of completely independent virtual machines are 
simulated by hypervisor, with its own virtual resources. Input-output ports and DMA channels 
are the virtual resources that are used in this approach. Consequently, every operating system that 
is supported by underlying hardware can be run by each virtual machine. It’s difficult to manage 
the full virtualization due to the overhead of handling these operations CPU. Nevertheless, the 
VM environment is able to provide "full virtualization" if it can offer an adequate illustration of 
the underlying hardware for the guest operating systems to run without modification. Full 
virtualization is shown in Figure 2.3: 
                                 
Figure  2.3: Full virtualization 
2.2.2 Para virtualization 
This approach is one of the first approved types of virtualization which is still utilized in a wide 
range of application. Para Virtual Machine (PVM) relies on special kernels and drivers and 
therefore does not need any particular hardware for realizing the virtualization. By using these 
special kernels and drivers choosing the operating systems are more limited. Particularly, an OS 
that are adjustable to work with hypervisor must be used by PVM. As shown in Figure 2.4, in 
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PVM one virtual machine which is the main VM has access to the resources and can allocate 
resources to other VMs. 
Since a main VM is controller in PVM and this main VM is in the same layer with other VMs, so 
access to the main VM (Dom 0) is much easier; however, if we have Full virtualization, access to 
hypervisor and getting system’s control is more difficult because VMs and controller are not in 
same layer in this type of virtualization. Hence Full virtualization is more secured than Para 
virtualization. 
Figure  2.4 : Para virtualization(Xen) 
2.2.3 Application virtualization 
In this approach, a server application can be run locally using the local resources without any 
need to install the complete application on user’s computer. These virtualized applications can be 
run in a small virtual environment having only the necessary resources for execution of the 
application [25]. 
2.2.4 Hardware support virtualization 
Hardware Virtual Machine (HVM) considered as the lowest level of virtualization. In HVM, in 
order to trap privileged calls from guest domains, a particular hardware capability is required. In 
this method, it is likely to have a fully virtualized machine without having any particular 
operating systems or drivers on the guest system. The hypervisor locates in the root mode and is 
in charge of resource allocation and I/O device interaction. However all the guest operating 
systems locate in the non-root mode and therefore they call out for the hypervisor to process their 
requests for resources. “Hyper calls” is a special virtualization instruction which is used to 
process the request of the guest operation systems [26]. The majority of recent CPUs are built 
with HVM capabilities, normally known as virtualization extensions [27]. 
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2.2.5 Resource virtualization 
Resource virtualization which is also called Storage Virtualization is the process of virtualizing 
system specific resources such as storage[25]. A variety of methods are available for resource 
virtualization process. The typical approaches are as follows [24, 28]: 
 Combining several separate components into a greater resource pool.
 Combining multiple discrete computers in grid computing or computer clusters in order to
have a large supercomputer with massive resources.
 Creating a number of small and easily accessible resources by partitioning a single
resource of the same type such as disk space.
2.2.6 Container Virtualization 
Container virtualization also known as OS-level virtualization creates multiple secure containers 
on a single machine. In this approach, a user can share a single kernel among several containers 
so that they can utilize computer resources securely with a minimal interference from other 
containers. According to Padala et al.[29], this method has the lowest overhead among all the 
existing virtualization techniques. 
2.3 Cloud standards 
In this section we want to speak about some definition in cloud computing environment: 
Vswitch: Vswitch in virtualization network is like a normal switch in traditional network. All 
traffic in virtualization network should come to Vswitch, and Vswitch determine where is the 
destination of packets. Place of Vswitch is in hypervisor[30]. 
Virtualization layer manager (hypervisor manager): it is a manager in lower level. As we see 
in section (2.2) virtualization is an important concept in cloud computing. Hypervisor 
management can manage all activities related to hypervisor. For better understanding I explain 
more with an example; Xen is a kind of hypervisor. Xen has a non-graphical interface, so this is 
difficult to use and manage hypervisor directly and also directly use of Xen command for 
managing is not good for security, so we have a software that called Xen manager. Xen manager 
is a graphical interface that can manage all activities related to Xen. Xen manager can create 
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VMs, check traffic and can check everything about VMs, create account and everything for a 
hypervisor in a data center. Xen manager is a hypervisor manager [31]. 
Cloud manager: there is a cloud manager for a cloud provider. Cloud manager is a higher level 
manager than hypervisor manager. A cloud manager can manage all hypervisor managers in a 
cloud provider company. Openstack [32] is a cloud manager. 
2.4 Cloud security 
The security of the cloud or the virtualization environment security is more difficult compared to 
the old networks due the availability of more systems to protect, more possible points of entry, 
more holes to patch and also more interconnection points in the virtualized environment [1] . 
A Cloud system at least must contain 5 important features to achieve sufficient security [33, 34]: 
availability, confidentiality, data integrity, control and audit. Though, it is difficult to achieve all 
the five features together. 
2.4.1 Availability 
Availability means, costumers have access to the cloud resources anywhere and anytime[33]. The 
availability in the cloud technologies can be increased through widespread internet-enabled 
access, although the user will remain dependent on the robust and timely provision of resources. 
Availability can be supported by capacity building and good architecture by the provider, while 
defined contracts and terms of agreement are considered as important supporters as well. 
Availability is a big concern in cloud computing because in cloud providers side, provide more 
availability means more reliability and more credit and in customers side, get services from a 
company with more availability means have access in their data from anywhere and in any time 
that they (customers) want. 
Availability can be improved by using some techniques like Migration (specially “live 
migration”) and Load balancing in the cloud environment.  
Migration is a technique which is used in cloud computing environment when a server has a lot 
of tasks to do or when the requests in this server are very high and pass a threshold. Using this 
technique, the server can migrate the tasks to other server in the cloud which is connected to the 
previous one and can do these tasks. For keeping a good availability, it is desirable to allow the 
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application of a set of resources to be transferred to other resources without the resources being 
stopped; as the user should not know the problem is happened. This kind of transfer called Live 
Migration. Live migration is a big concept for research. The strategy of live migration of multiple 
virtual machines is made with different methods of resource reservation[35]. There are examples 
of Live Migration algorithm in [36, 37]. 
Load balancing is another factor that has a significant impact on the performance of cloud 
computing environment [38]. Good load balancing results in a more efficient cloud computing 
and consequently the user satisfaction is improved. A variety of load balancing algorithms are 
available such as an algorithm for load distribution of workloads among nodes of a cloud by the 
use of Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) that is provided by K. Nishant et al.[39]  and a model of 
load balancing for the public cloud based on the concept of partitioning clouds with a switching 
mechanism to choose different strategies for different situations is provided by Gaochao Xu et al. 
[38]. 
2.4.2 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is defined as the ability to keep the users’ data safe and secret in the Cloud 
systems[34]. For many users, the confidentiality of the cloud systems is a main barrier to join in 
cloud and many users believe that their business sensitive data will never be in the cloud "in the 
article entitled" Above the cloud [40].  
Accordingly, in order to attract even more users to the Cloud, the confidentiality is a fundamental 
requirement.  
Storage encryption is an option to improve confidentiality [33]. For instance by encrypting the 
data before put it in a Cloud; you make them even more secure than unencrypted data in a local 
data center. However, it can cause some problems itself. If we want to storage encrypt data in the 
cloud, the encryption needs to be done in our system. We also should download our data from 
cloud storage and decrypt them in our own system; therefore, we require a computer or a system 
with a processor and hardware and it is contrary to the cloud benefits. Cloud environment wants 
to go in a way that the users can have access to data and their computing work with a simple 
device that only have a browser; something like a very simple mobile phone. 
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2.4.3 Data Integrity 
In the cloud system, data integrity is defined as protecting information integrity (e.g., to protect 
them from lost or modification by unauthorized users). [41] 
As data is the base for both cloud computing providers and users it is very crucial to protect it. 
Consequently keeping data integrity is a fundamental mission which is expected to be attained by 
techniques such as RAID-liked strategies[42], digital signature[43]. 
2.4.4 Control 
In the Cloud system Control is defined as the regulation of the usage of the system, 
including the applications, their infrastructure and the data. In the Cloud Computing 
system, distributed computation is always involved on multiple large-scale data sets across 
a large number of computer nodes. Furthermore, all internet users can contribute their 
individual data to the Cloud Computer systems located on the other side of the Internet, and 
start using them. Storing all these personal data in the environment of cloud computing 
may result in the system users of cloud computing being faced to many threats to the 
personal data[41]. Users are concerning about privacy of their data because user don’t 
know where is their information and they should put their information in a place that is not 
in their control. 
2.4.5 Audit 
Audit means watching what occurred in the Cloud system. To provide facilities with the ability to 
watch what happened in the system, we can add auditability as an additional layer above the 
virtualized operation system (or virtualized application environment) hosted on the virtual 
machine.To do so, three major attributes should be audited: 
 Events: All factors that affected the system availability including the state changes.
 Logs: Comprehensive information about users’ application and its runtime environment.
 Monitoring: It has to be limited to the reasonable requirement of the Cloud provider for
running their facility.
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As a result of adding this new feature (i.e., adding the auditability as an extra layer in the virtual 
operation systems) the Cloud Computing developers have to focus on providing virtualized 
capabilities instead of specific hardware[41]. Actually audit is one of the cloud manager task that 
can provide more security in cloud computing. 
2.5 Security challenges 
Architecture’s problems and attacks in cloud environment will result in losing one or some of the 
above concepts in cloud computing or virtualization environment. Cloud computing introduces 
new concepts such as multi-tenancy that creates new challenges to the security community [44, 
45] and introduces additional security implications [46, 47].
Some of the Security weaknesses in virtualization environment and cloud computing are listed 
below: 
2.5.1 Rootkit Attacks 
A rootkit is a type of malicious stealthy software that provides privileged access to the system 
and gives the attacker the ability to hide the existence of several malicious processes or programs 
in order to make them undetectable[48, 49]. As malicious processes can make a lot of problem 
for cloud so Rootkit can attack to all availability, confidentiality, data integrity, control and audit 
[50].  
2.5.2 VM Escape 
While virtual machines are permitted to share the resources of the host machine, they still are 
able to provide isolation between VMs and between the VMs and the host. Specifically, because 
of the way the virtual machines are designed, a program running in one virtual machine cannot 
monitor, or communicate with programs running in either other VMs or the host. But in real 
cases isolation is compromised by the organizations. The flexible isolation is configured to meet 
the organization requirements which exploit the security of the systems [49]. A VM that has 
access to the host can do whatever it wants, so this is risky for all security objectives especially 
for availability, confidentiality and data integrity [26, 46, 47]. 
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2.5.3 VM monitoring from another VM 
Isolation plays an important role in virtualization. However, it can be considered as a threat if one 
VM without any difficulties is allowed to monitor resources of another VM [51]. It is dangerous 
for confidentiality goals [52]. 
2.5.4 Guest-to-Guest attack 
Isolation can become a threat to the environment if it is not carefully deployed. It is very crucial 
that isolation is wisely configured and maintained in a virtual environment in order to guarantee 
that none of the applications running in one VM has access to the applications running in another 
VM. On the other word, isolation should be strongly maintained to ensure that break-in into one 
virtual machine can never provide any access to virtual machines in the same environment or to 
the underlying host machine. It is known as guest-to-guest attack [23, 51, 53].  
Confidentiality and data integrity even availability may take effect in these attacks. 
2.5.5 Denial of service attack 
Denial of service (Dos) is one of the most common intrusion approaches and often causes 
countless economic losses and impact. A non-legitimate user tries Dos attack to degrade or deny 
resources to legitimate users. DoS attack has many results for instance: the system may work 
very slowly or the user may be not able to connect the network server. Denial of service is 
attacked to the availability of the server.  
The Distributed DoS named as DDoS is the most popular method of DoS attack as it is able to 
cause more serious effects easily and rapidly.  
Figure2.5 shows DOS and DDOS attack in old system and DDOS attack in cloud computing 
systems. It is shown that the DDOS attack is more complex than DOS one because DDoS attack 
consists of three basic elements: 1) The chief or the attacker, 2) Host machine (zombie) and 3) 
victim machine. At the first step of attack, main attacker (chief) finds many host machines 
(zombies) and implements some software on them to have a communication with them for future 
(attack time). The main step of attack happens by the host machine with an order from the chief. 
An attack which is a combination of many different origins is far more difficult than the attack 
which contains only one source.  
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In cloud computing system, the situation is even more complicated because in cloud computing 
there is a distributed server (figure 2.5 (below)) and it causes a bigger problem. Virtualization, 
multi tenancy and the use of share resources are some of the reasons that make DDOS attack 
much more serious and more difficult in cloud computing system compared to the old network 
(non-virtualization environment). 
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Figure  2.5:DoS attack (above) and DDoS attack (middle) in old system and DDoS attack in cloud 
computing system (below) 
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Also virtualization technique itself is causing overload on the server [54] so even a small attack 
in cloud computing environment can disable the server. 
Here, a quick review of some type of DOS attacks is provided: 
2.5.5.1 Application Layer DDOS 
Application layer DDos attacks is a type of DDOs that happend on the application layer. Attacker 
uses vulnerabilities of protocols that used by applications in this type of attack[55]. The most 
important victim for this type of attacks are web services[56]. Application layer distributed denial 
of service (app DDOS) attacks usually use less bandwidth and are stealthier in nature when 
compared to volumetric attacks. However, they can have a similar impact to service as they 
target specific characteristics of well-known applications such as HTTP, DNS, VoIP or Simple 
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [57]. 
X-DoS and H-DoS are two type of web server attacks and most attackers are more inclined to use 
of these web based attacks because their implementation are simple than others [58, 59]. 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) DOS (X-DOS) occurs when an XML message is sent to a 
Web Server or Web Service with malicious content to use up all their resources[60]. 
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) based Denial of Service (H-DOS) attacks can send 
randomized HTTP requests to the victim web server to exhaust its communication channels [61].  
2.5.5.2 UDP Flood 
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flooding attacks exploit UDP’s connectionless mechanism 
and its limitation in responding to the request. Ports on a remote host will be attacked by flood of 
many UDP packets, it force the host to constantly check for the application listening at that port; 
since there is no application, so a response will be sent that there is destination Inaccessible 
packet[62]. 
2.5.5.3 TCP SYN Flood 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) SYN Flood is one of the simplest and most common 
attacks seen on the Internet [54]. Several requests by attackers for huge instances of making 
connection, lead a denial of service attack. This attack benefits from the number of allocated 
22 
resources by a server in order to perform a 3-way handshake[54]. Generally, when a request is 
sent to the server for getting a connection, this request is estimated and authenticated, and then 
the user can pay to get the service. The flooding attack is occurring in the authenticity step. So 
there is no need to pay for that. An attacker overloads a victim with a lot of connection requests 
so that it cannot respond to legitimate requests, since the IP address of attacker is false. For this 
attack, many TCP SYN packets are sent to the victim. For each new TCP connection the victim 
allocates buffers and consequently a SYN-ACK is transmitted in response to the connection 
request [54].  
To have a better understanding of these kinds of Dos attacks, I give an example in the real world. 
Imagine that there is a store with one seller and a lot of clients. Assume that each client comes in 
the store and asks about the prices of the merchandises. They just ask without buying anything. 
When the seller wants to answer costumer’s question, he/she (costumer) escape. If for example 
1000 clients come to the store, seller can’t answer all their questions at the same time and the 
seller’s mind is crashed. 
If we bring this example to the network systems we can put hackers instead of clients, packets 
instead of merchandises and server instead of seller. 
Base on [54], the steps that are involved in the TCP SYN Flooding attack are summarized here: 
 An attacker sends a large number of service requests with false address.
 The server sends a response message back to the sender.
 The server waits for the response information from the user.
 Since the addresses have been forgotten, the server can't get any information and must
wait for a long time and the connection will be cut off with overtime.
 The resource allocated for this request cannot be released.
 If the request number is very large, the server resources will be used up finally. So the
new user can’t get the service and the attack is completed successfully.
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2.5.6 Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) (Special DDOS attack for 
cloud computing) 
Economic denial of sustainability is a scenario in which the customer pays extra to the cloud 
provider because of the attack. According to the general definition of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) one of the most important benefits of using cloud computing 
is to have On-demand services[3]. It means that cloud customers don’t need to buy whole 
resources and infrastructure for the first time. The method of payment in cloud environment is 
pay per use[4]. Based on this benefit of cloud computing, there is a new kind of DDOS attack 
which is called Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS)[5]. Since cloud environment is elastic 
and works based on the pay as you use model, additional resources are easily available; but the 
customer has to pay extra for them. Since EDoS attacks are considered for economic issues that 
thes type of attacks bring to cloud, so different types of DDoS attacks that we mentioned above 
can count as an EDoS attack. Also, because in this situation DDoS attack is transferred to the 
hypervisor, it can be dangerous for the Hypervisor and finally for the entire cloud. One way to 
prevent this problem is to limit the resource allocation[9]; however, by doing so we actually limit 
some of the most important advantages of the cloud computing . 
2.6 Related work in Defence and Detection algorithm against DDOS 
and DOS 
Both DoS and DDoS attacks are serious threats to the Internet. Consequently, it is necessary to 
have a more intricate mechanism to determine the malicious traffic from the legal ones. Different 
detection and defence algorithms have been introduced in the literature [58, 63-74] and etc, for 
cloud computing and in traditional system. 
2.6.1 Defense and Detection Solutions for Cloud Environments 
Lanjuan Yang et al. [63] adopted an approach based on a traceback Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA), to identify the source of a DDoS attack on the cloud. They proposed a detection approach 
called SBTA (SOA-Based Traceback Approach) to traceback and identify the source of DDoS 
attacks. They also offered a filter called Cloud-filter. In the proposed architecture, firstly all 
24 
service requests go to SBTA for marking, then if the packet is identified as normal, the services 
will be provided to the corresponding customer. 
Some of the current attacks that attackers may initiate as HTTP and XML have been reproduced 
in [64]. They also proposed a solution for trackbacking based on their Cloud TraceBack (CTB) 
approach to find the source of these attacks. Furthermore, they introduced a back-propagation 
neutral network, called Cloud Protector, which was trained to detect and filter such attack traffic. 
The authors of [64] used their previous work on the service-oriented traceback architecture (now 
called Cloud TraceBack) to defend against X- DoS [58, 66] in the field of cloud computing. 
Jin Wang et al.[65] focus on the application layer DDoS (app-DDoS) attacks, and a new relative 
entropy based app-DDoS detection method was proposed. They conducted a 3-stage strategy: (1) 
the click ratio of the web object was defined and the cluster method was used to extract the click 
ratio features; (2) with the click ratio features of the learning stage, the relative entropy was used 
to detect the dubious sessions; (3) experiments based on the real traffic were conducted to 
validate their detection method. 
Ang Li et al [67] presented a new algorithm for detecting anomalies in a large data center base on 
analyzing IP (source and destination) structure and design a lightweight anomaly detection 
algorithm that can be used for very large data centers. The authors used the analyzing real-world 
traffic traces in order to show several characteristics of the IP address distribution observed in 
large data centers for cloud computing services. In this approach, they revealed a stable 
concentration on selected bytes of both source and destination IP addresses. Eventually they 
could derive centroid based statistics to characterize data center traffic. Basically, the 
concentrated distribution of octets in the IP addresses is a common characteristic of the traffic 
flows in data centers and this is the feature that has been used in this article as a main parameter 
in their algorithm. The presented algorithm in [67] consistently diagnoses the abnormal traffic 
from normal ones, and does so in a short time (but not always) with a low false alarm rate. This 
algorithm is very sensitive and has a low run-time overhead, so it is good to use it in large-scale 
data centers. In this algorithm an adaptive threshold has been used instead of a fixed one. 
Because, it is not possible to precisely distinguish a normal situation from abnormal by using a 
fixed threshold. But this detection algorithm works based on IP (source and destination) address 
and in the case of DDOS Flooding attack we don’t have a true source IP address; therefore this 
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algorithm is not able to detect this attack. On the other hand, based on our knowledge in some 
DDoS attacks, attackers use a special script in data part of IP address that changes the header 
uninterrupted. The approach presented in this paper is not useful in detecting these kinds of 
DDoS attacks because this approach is based on IP address and IP isn’t a good parameter for 
detecting this kind of attacks. 
In [68] authors provided an approach to monitor the resource usage by using VM for Kernel-
based Virtual Machine (KVM) system. Generally, it is very important to know how much 
resources are used by each VM to recognize the VM and subsequently the user who uses high 
percentage of the resources, and to limit providing the service to this user if needed. In this paper, 
the authors presented a performance monitoring tool for KVM based virtual machines, which 
measures the CPU overhead incurred by the hypervisor on behalf of the virtual machine along-
with the CPU usage of virtual machine itself. 
They assumed that the overhead is negligible as it is less than 1 percent on the host system. This 
approach can be used for resource provisioning to support performance associated QoS 
requirements, identification of bottlenecks during VM placements, and resource profiling of 
applications in cloud environments. Also presented approach in [68] gives separate hypervisor 
usage per VM.  
This approach is good enough for a normal situation in virtualization; however it is not able to 
distinguish between a legitimate user and an illegitimate one. The legitimate user may have a 
high percentage of CPU, but we cannot be certain that this user is an attacker. 
Ryan Shea et al. [54] tried to find a solution for Dos attack by using a threshold and modifying it 
in the interrupt request. However, using a threshold may not be a good solution because the small 
threshold improves the sensitivity, but increases the possibility of introducing false positives. On 
the other hand, a larger threshold is likely to reduce the sensitivity of detection. Basically, in 
normal situations, we might have a large load in the network without any attack; however, using 
the threshold this situation is considered as an attack.  
In addition to the contributions presented above, good detection algorithms have been proposed 
for non-virtualized environment; some of them are summarized hereafter. 
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2.6.2 Defense and Detection Solutions for non-Cloud Environments 
In [69] a network monitoring tool called AGURI is presented. It can detect DDOS attacks using 
collected traffic patterns in long-term monitoring network traffic. For detecting the flooding 
attacks in this algorithm, they needed to know information about normal situation in network 
(when attack does not appear). The algorithm requires a large amount of traffic data. Simple 
Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is one of simple mechanisms for collecting the data 
from the routers and switches. So they use of SNMP for this goal.  
In [70], batch sequential and adaptive sequential methods for rapid detection of DDOS attacks are 
introduced. In this approach, with statistical analysis of data on different layers of the network, 
they try to find a sudden change in the traffic. The idea is that DDOS attacks make a sudden 
change in the traffic model in comparison with a normal traffic. Authors provide a detection 
method in this paper that employs statistical analysis of data from multiple layers of the network 
protocol for detecting very subtle traffic changes, which are usually for DOS attacks. Threshold 
of test statistics is used by both the batch and adaptive sequential methods to achieve a fixed rate 
of false alarms. In addition, these methods can detect combinations of different types of DOS 
attacks. 
In [71], MULTOPS (MUlti- Level Tree for Online Packet Statistics) data structure is presented 
for detecting DDOS attacks. By using this data structure, the input stream into the network will 
be compared to the output data stream. If any asymmetry is found between input and output, it 
will be considered as an attack. Routers or network monitors are enabled to detect ongoing 
bandwidth attacks by MULTOPS and with using a simple heuristic based on disproportionate 
difference between the packet rate going to and coming from a host or subnet. This is based on 
the assumption that, the packet rate of traffic going in one direction is proportional to the packet 
rate of traffic going in the opposite direction in normal traffic situation.  
In [72, 73] network traffic that is expressed in the rate of TCP signs and rate of different contracts 
has been analyzed and it has been shown that when the attack occurred, the rates are changed. In 
addition to detecting DDOS attacks, a set of state actions generated by machine learning 
algorithms has been evaluated in a simulated environment. A network traffic analysis mechanism 
is provided in [72] which computes the ratio of the number of TCP flags to the total number of 
TCP packets. Authors compile a pair of the TCP flag rates and appear or not appear of the DDoS 
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attack into state-action rules with using machine learning algorithms base on the calculation of 
TCP flag rates.  
In [74], a method for the detection of DDOS attacks is discussed which is fundamentally based 
on the information theory especially Kolmogorov complexity. This approach assumes that the 
attackers in DDOS attack are trying to flood the target machine by producing similar packet from 
a different source. It is alleged that by using a method based on the “Kolmogorov complexity” 
the packets with similar patterns can be detected. Authors believe that one of the important points 
in this algorithm is that it does not require special filtering rules and hence it can detect any type 
of DDoS attack. They provide an algorithm that is shown to perform better than simple packet-
counting or load-measuring approaches. 
All of these previous contributions tried to detect DDOS attacks in non-virtualization 
environment but as we discussed the problem in the virtualization environment is much more 
complex and bigger than non-virtualization environment. Nevertheless we think that with use of 
some technique and a good architecture design, we can leverage a combination of detection 
DDOS attack algorithms from non-virtualization to cloud. Although, the main concept and 
definition of DDOS attack is same in cloud and non-virtualization system with small 
substitutions (for example there is resources sharing and on demand resources in cloud 
computing). The differentiation point is in efficiency of this attack that is much more in cloud 
computing as discussed before and also another point is cloud architecture is different from non-
virtualization systems. 
2.7 Related work in detection and defense against EDoS attacks in 
cloud computing 
Some approaches have been introduced in the literature on how to detect, defense and mitigate 
EDoS attacks in cloud computing environment. 
Sqalli et al. [75] proposed an approach called EDoS-Shield to mitigate EDoS attack in Cloud 
Computing. They divided the received requests from the user side into two categories: the 
legitimate request and the generated by bots request. They used a verifier and sent the first 
request from a new IP to this verifier. The verifier does a verification process and decides to put 
this address either in the white or the black list. These lists are related to legitimate requests and 
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bots generated requests, respectively. The subsequent requests that are from an IP address in the 
black list will be blocked by a virtual firewall and the subsequent requests from an IP address in 
the white list can connect to the cloud services to get services that they want. 
The proposed work by Naresh Kumar et al. [76] provided an architecture to mitigate the web 
service EDoS attacks. In this work a crypto puzzle (Client puzzle) has been generated to identify 
a legitimate user. The customers must solve this puzzle to have an authorization for using the 
cloud services. Their work is based on the service provider assessment about the state of the 
system, which can be normal or suspicious. Normal and suspicious states are depending on the 
Server load and the Bandwidth load. Using this information, the architecture decides about the 
severity of the puzzle. 
Enhanced DDoS- Mitigation System (Enhanced DDoS-MS) is a framework presented by 
Alosaimi et al. [77] to mitigate EDoS attacks in cloud computing. This framework identifies 
legitimate users from malicious ones by testing the first packet received from the user by using a 
Graphical Turing Test (GTT). Also they utilized an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) to detect 
malware in the contents of packets. Crypto puzzle and white/black list approaches were used to 
mitigate EDoS attacks in this work similar to the previous articles that we discussed [75, 76]. 
A cost effective EDoS attack mitigation framework for E-Commerce applications in cloud 
environments has been provided by Masood et al. [78] which is called EDoS Armor. This paper 
provided a multi-layered defense system; at the first step, only a limited number of valid users are 
allowed to connect to the application to be less bothering. Next, a browsing behavior-based 
learning mechanism is used and the priority to the users is allocated on this basis. This priority 
value determines how the resources are shared among the users; the higher the priority the more 
resources are allocated and the lower the priority the fewer resources are assigned. 
An approach to control virtual resource access to mitigate EDoS attacks against cloud 
infrastructures is provided by Baig et al. [79]. In this paper an approach has been provided to 
selectively control the user requests for a service within the service provider. In this approach 
incoming requests from the user are classified into normal and suspicious requests. Afterward, 
further analysis is implemented to guarantee that those normal and legitimate users have the 
priority of cloud service access; however, users which are in the suspicious class have a lesser 
priority to the service access, until they are removed from the suspect list.  
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Al-Haidari et al. [80] provided an algorithm that uses Time To Live (TTL) field of the IP header 
to detect and mitigate the spoofed IP EDoS attacks. The authors made a use of the white/black 
list approach in their work. They used a verifier and a threshold system to classify the entering 
packets to the normal and the suspicious ones and to collect source IP addresses along with the 
amounts of TTL in the whitelist and the blacklist for the normal and the suspicious packets, 
respectively.  
Koduru et al. [81] proposed a detection approach for EDoS. They used the Time Spent on a Web 
Page (TSP) to detect HTTP EDoS attacks. The main idea of their work came from the fact that 
the TSP in the attack situation is different from the mean TSP of a web page in the normal 
situation. They calculated TSP and the Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) of TSP and showed the 
results in a graph. But the provided approach in this paper doesn’t work automatically and a 
cloud administrator needs to always monitor the graphs. Also this paper provided a solution for 
detecting only HTTP EDoS attacks and cannot detect other kinds of EDoS attacks.  
As shown in this review, the majority of the papers in the field of EDoS attacks have focused on 
finding a solution for the defense and mitigation of only one type of EDoS attacks in cloud 
computing. Although, in general, there are a few works on detecting this kind of attack as well.  
In the next chapter we will add new metrics to these structures and will propose a new model for 
detecting different types of EDoS attacks in cloud computing and we want to find out if using 
one inclusive framework for simultaneously detecting different types of EDOS attack is more 
accurate than using a separate framework for each attack. 
2.8 Open problem 
DDoS attacks and a special type of these attacks that called TCP SYN flooding attacks are 
common and popular attacks in cloud computing. EDoS which is a new and special type of 
DDoS attack can also influence Cloud through a DDoS and make economic problem for cloud 
costumer and provider. These attacks, specially when combined, cause a big problem against 
availability.  
In order to have a secure system against these attacks, three algorithms are required for the 
following purposes: 
1- Detecting the attack  
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2- Defense (based on a good detection) against the attack that took place in the system   
3- Preventing the future problems. 
The first important step in confronting the attack is to detect it. To obtain a good result in both 
defense and prevention against this attack primarily we need to have a reliable system for 
detecting the attack with an acceptable and high percentage of reliability. 
There are a lot of algorithms in traditional (non-virtualization) system for detecting DDoS attacks 
such as presented algorithm in [69-73]; However, virtualization technique itself is causing 
overload on the server [54] and accordingly even a small attack in cloud computing environment 
can disable the server. Therefore, the traditional algorithms which work well in non-virtualization 
system are useless in cloud environment if we don’t apply the required modification.  
The majority of existing algorithms for detection DDoS attacks in cloud computing environment 
work based on packet information (for example IP address); However, a big challenge in this 
case is that the IP address in DDOS attacks can be false. Furthermore, the packet in DDoS attack 
is like packet in normal situation and the only difference is that there are too many packets in 
DDoS attack;  thus packet cannot be a good area to work on for detecting DDoS [69, 72]. 
Consequently the present packet based approaches are not reliable and powerful enough for 
DDoS detection.  
On the other hand,the current algorithms for EDoS attacks are useful only for one attack and to 
our best knowledge there is not any global model to detect all types of EDOS .Moreover, they 
have mainly focused only on finding a solution for the defense and mitigation of EDoS attacks in 
cloud computing. 
Accordingly it is necessary to design a novel, powerful and inclusive algorithm which works for 
all types of DDoS and EDoS attacks in cloud computing. Working on “traffic and resource usage 
anomaly detection” seems to be a promising approach for this purpose. It’s mainly because of the 
fact that even if attackers in DDoS attack can make packets like normal packets but the traffic 
generated in DDoS attack isn't identical to traffic in normal situation. Additionally, in the time of 
attack proportion of resource usage will be different from this proportion in the normal situation. 
Therefore, investigating the features of resource usage in DDoS attacks can result in a better 
detection.  
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These features vary depends on the type of attack and accordingly in order to design an inclusive 
and general algorithm we need to add all features of all attacks to our model. Consequently, using 
this work, cloud providers can understand which type of attacks happened in their system and can 
implement a true strategy to defense against that attack. 
Features of one kind of attack play an important role to detect another type; consequently we can 
expect much more reliable results using a global and all inclusive algorithm compared to the 
algorithms which consider only the features of one attack. Accordingly, it is obvious that we 
don’t compare the attacks themselves with each other. Instead, the virtual machines which are 
allocated to the victim server will be compared.   
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
As discused in chapter 1, our aim is to detect DDoS and EDoS attacks in cloud computing by 
working on traffic and resource usage anomaly detection.  
Our main idea for detecting these attacks is that, even if attackers in DDoS and EDoS attacks can 
make packets like normal packets but the traffic generated in DDOS attack isn't like traffic in 
normal situation. Also the proportion of resource usage is completly different in case of attack 
compareed to the normal situation. Therefore we investigate the samples of traffic and resource 
usage in cloud computing servers in order to find a proper approach to detect these 3 types of 
attacks (HTTP attack, Database attack and TCP SYN Flood attack). 
Our ultimate goal is to introduce a global and inclusive algorithm which works perfectly for 
HTTP attack, Database attack and TCP SYN Flood attack no matter what time each attack 
happens. Consequently, instead of using three different algorithms for detecting these attacks we 
will be able to use a unique and generalized algorithm. This way, we get much more reliable 
results compared to the algorithms which consider only the metrics of one attack because specific 
metrics of one kind of attack can play an important role to detect another type. 
This section describes our methodology to address the research problems and achieve the 
mentioned objective. In order to detect EDoS and DDoS attacks in cloud computing, we will 
discuss about the information of normal traffic and resources in section (3.1). Section (3.2) 
explains our monitoring and sampling module. Section (3.3) describes the attack identification; 
section (3.4) explains the metrics which will be used in detection procedure; section (3.5) 
describes the change point detection algorithm; section (3.6) provides our algorithm to detect 
different types of DDoS and EDoS attacks and finally section (3.7) is a conclusion for this 
chapter. 
3.1 Extracting the information for the normal traffic and resources  
At the very first step, we will need to have a normal traffic and resources from the hypervisor. 
We must first generate this traffic intentionally and collect the samples. The amount of the 
samples must be enough to cover the various traffic situations at different hours of the day. These 
traffic samples must cover heavy and light traffic times as various services may be provided to 
customer by the cloud provider depending on the time. We want to analyze this traffic and the 
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resource usage in normal situation to extract some thresholds and investigate the behavior and 
proportion of resource usage in normal situation and extract some information. With this 
information, we can verify if there is a sudden change in the traffic and resources (as it will be 
explained in details in section (3.3)).  
3.2 Monitoring and Sampling Module 
We will need to generate HTTP attack, Database attack and TCP SYN Flood attack traffics in 
order to collect the corresponding samples and investigate the behavior of resource usage. 
As we discussed in chapter (2), the virtualization is the main concept of cloud computing and 
every service in cloud computing is located in a virtual machine. For example, the database is 
placed in one virtual machine and the web server is located in a separate virtual machine. 
Therefore when customers want to put their services in the cloud, they must order a set of VMs 
(we consider the infrastructure as a service). However, as discussed earlier, cloud computing 
system is a pay-as-you-go service, so customers have to pay for the amount of VM that they 
used. They can apply for more resources whenever they want.  
On the hypervisor side, we monitor all the events and the requests from each VM to extract some 
metrics.  
In our work, every time a virtual machine applies for more resources and sends its requests to the 
hypervisor we can have a sampling and monitoring system. That way, we can trace the kernel 
system of VM which sent a request and VMs which communicate with that VM. We will then be 
able to get the samples from the traffics of VMs for our analysis.  
To achieve this goal it is required to design a “Monitoring and Sampling” module as a part of the 
targeted DDoS detection architecture. Hypervisor is the best place for positioning this part 
because all the traffics for all virtual machines come to the hypervisor. Therefore the traffic in the 
hypervisor consists of a combination of traffics in all VMs and consequently hypervisor can have 
access to each VMs resource to extract metrics. Figure 3.1 shows Detecting and monitoring 
system. 
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Figure  3.1: Detecting and monitoring system 
3.3 Attack identification 
Our main approach to detect HTTP attack, Database attack and TCP SYN Flood attack is 
designed based on the fact that even if attackers in DDoS and EDoS attacks can make packets 
like normal packets but the traffic generated in attack situation isn't identical to traffic in a normal 
situation. Also the proportion of resource usage is completely different in case of attack 
compared to normal situation. Accordingly each attack can be identified by specific features 
which are related to the traffic and resource usage in in that attack.  
Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 2, every service in cloud computing is located in a virtual 
machine. For example, the database is placed in one virtual machine and the web server is located 
in a separate virtual machine. Different types of attack target different virtual machines as 
follows:  
 EDoS attacks including HTTP attack and Database attack: In HTTP attack Webserver 
virtual machine will be targeted by attackers. In case of Database attacks the virtual machine 
allocated to Database receives many database queries for each HTTP request [7, 8]. 
 DDoS attacks including TCP SYN Flood attack: TCP SYN Flood attack occurs in 
webserver virtual machine. 
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To design our model, we need to investigate the behaviour of resource usage in virtual machines 
which are in relationship with the victim virtual machine. For this purpose we collect features 
which are related to traffic and resource usage in each attack. These features are the metrics of 
our profile and will be explained in details in the following section.  
It is important to notice that we don’t compare the attacks themselves with each other. However, 
instead of using a separate algorithm for detecting each attack we will introduce an inclusive and 
generalized algorithm which contains the metrics of all those three attacks. Metrics of one kind of 
attack plays an important role to detect another type; therefore we can expect much more reliable 
results using our global algorithm compared to the algorithms which consider only the metrics of 
one attack. 
3.4 Metrics 
In this section we introduce the metrics that we will use to design our detection model. These are 
the features that we want to extract from the traffic or with resource usage monitoring. We used 
the previous works to find which features are useful for us. The references related to each metric 
will be cited in the related section for explain each metric. 
The metrics are selected from prior works on Http attacks such as [54, 81-85], on TCP SYN 
Flood attacks such as [2, 54, 82, 86] and in Database attacks such as [54, 81, 82]. 
The selected metrics are as follow: 
TSP: Time Spent on a Web Page. 
IOWi: Network I/O in Webserver virtual machine (incoming) (Kbits/s). 
IOWo: Network I/O in Webserver virtual machine (outgoing) (Kbits/s). 
IODi: Network I/O in Database virtual machine (incoming) (Kbits/s). 
IODo: Network I/O in Database virtual machine (outgoing) (Kbits/s). 
CPUW: Percent of CPU usage in Webserver virtual machine. 
CPUD: Percent of CPU usage in Database virtual machine. 
MemW: Percent of Memory usage in Webserver virtual machine. 
NBWph: Network bandwidth usage in Webserver per hours (MB). 
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NBWpd: Network bandwidth usage in Webserver per day (MB). 
NBWpw: Network bandwidth usage in Webserver per week (GB). 
NBWpm: Network bandwidth usage in Webserver per month (GB). 
R(SYN): The ratio of SYN packets in TCP packets. 
R(ACK): The ratio of ACK packets in TCP packets. 
R(SYN+ACK): The ratio of SYN and ACK packets in TCP packets. 
NPi: Number of packet (incoming) per second. 
NPo: Number of packet (outgoing) per second. 
NHOP: Number of half opened connection. 
In the following subsections we explain how these metrics can help us to detect attacks. It is 
important to notice that our goal is not to compare different types of attacks. Rather than that, by 
comparing the ratio of these metrics we will detect the type of attack. Therefore, we need to 
understand how these metrics vary in each of the three types of attack.   
3.4.1 Time Spent on a Web Page (TSP) 
The Time Spent on a Web Page (TSP), which has been previously presented by Koduru et 
al.[81], will be used as a metric of our work. The TSP is calculated using the following equation 
[81]. 
   (   )               (1) 
Where     represents the accessed page and     represents the time stamp of the request for 
    page of i   user. Also     and      are two consecutive requests for the webpage. 
Amount of TSP in case of HTTP attack suddenly decrease because the attackers send a flood of 
HTTP requests to the server. On the other hand, when a Database EDOS attack occurs there are a 
lot of requests sent to database virtual machine while the webserver virtual machine isn’t very 
busy; therefore TSP in this case has a jump. Also since TCP SYN Flood attack happens before 
completing the access to the webserver, there is no TSP in case of TCP SYN Flood attack. 
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3.4.2 Network I/O in webserver virtual machine and Database virtual 
machine 
One of the resources which has been investigated in case of DDoS attacks in the privious works 
is Network I/O [54, 82]. Our goal in this work is to collect the incoming rate and outgoing rate of 
network I/O in webserver VM and database VM and to investigate the proportion of these 
metrics. 
The amount of network I/O in webserver will be a little high in case of HTTP attack as attackers 
send a flood of HTTP requests to the server but this amount is still not very different from a busy 
normal traffic; however, database virtual machine has a very small network I/O in HTTP attack 
situation because the target of HTTP attack is webserver; therefore, database is almost 
unemployed in this case and this is the main difference between HTTP attack traffic and busy 
normal traffic in terms of network I/O values. In the normal situation however, network I/O in 
webserver virtual machine is almost equal to network I/O in database virtual machine.  
Contrary to HTTP attacks, when a Database EDOS attack occurs there is a lot of requests to 
database virtual machine while webserver virtual machine isn’t very busy; so webserver VM has 
a very small network I/O and database VM has a slightly high rate of network I/O in database 
attack situation.  
Also since TCP SYN Flood attack happens before completing the access to webserver the rate of 
network I/O will be small in both webserver and database virtual machines in case of this attack. 
We will use IPTraf for collecting I/O rates which is a tool for monitoring network statistics in 
webserver virtual machine and database virtual machine. 
3.4.3 Percent of CPU usage in webserver virtual machine and database 
virtual machine 
Based on privous works [54, 82] another resource that is affected in DDoS and EDoS attacks is 
CPU usage. The trend of CPU usage in webserver VM and database VM is similar to network 
I/O trend in webserver and database VMs in case of HTTP attack, Data base attack and also 
normal situation. CPU usage in webserver virtual machine is almost equal to CPU usage in 
database virtual machine in the normal situation. The percent of CPU usage in webserver will be 
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a little high in case of HTTP attack as attackers send a flood of HTTP requests to webserver 
virtual machine and webserver has to do a lot of work to answer these requests. On the other 
hand, database virtual machine has a very small percent of CPU usage in HTTP attack situation 
because the target of attack is webserver and therefore, database is almost unemployed in this 
case.  
Database attack has an opposite trend to what observed in HTTP attack. When a Database EDOS 
attack occurs there are a lot of requests to database virtual machine while webserver virtual 
machine isn’t very busy; thus webserver VM has a very small CPU usage and database VM has a 
slightly high percent of CPU usage in database attack situation. Also in TCP SYN Flood attack 
the percent of CPU usage in webserver is very high and is almost 2 or 3 times or even 4 times 
more than amount of this metric in database virtual machine. 
The CPU usage data will be collected according to the proposed method by Shea et al. [54]. 
There are a lot of tools and commands in Linux to collect CPU usage. We are going to use the 
Top command on the hypervisor side for this task because in this command we can monitor CPU 
usage per each VM separately. 
3.4.4 Memory usage in webserver virtual machine  
One other metric that we want to use in this work is memory usage in webserver VM. We chose 
memory usage as a metrics because other researchers in previous works [54, 82] revealed the 
influence of DDoS attacks on Memory usage. Memory usage in HTTP attack and database attack 
is very similar to normal situation; although it can grow up very fast in case of TCP SYN Flood 
attack because this attack directly influences the Memory usage. Thus we have a sudden increase 
in Memory usage in TCP SYN Flood attack. 
We will collect memory usage of each VM by using the Top command similar to the last section. 
3.4.5 Network bandwidth in webserver 
Network bandwidth is one of the most important metrics that plays a key role in our detecting 
model in case of detecting Bandwidth – consuming attacks like HTTP EDoS attack. Based on 
previous works [54, 82-85]  Network Bandwidth is an important resource which is affected in a 
DDoS or EDoS attacks.  
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We expect that bandwidth usage won’t change significantly compared to a normal situation 
neither in TCP SYN Flood attack nor in Database attack. However, bandwidth usage of 
webserver goes through a sudden increasing in case of HTTP attack. 
We will capture the bandwidth usage in webserver virtual machine on the hypervisor side by 
using vnstat per hour, day, week and month.  
3.4.6 Packet information 
Depending on the type of the attack, a sudden change in a number of network packets can occur 
in the time of attack. This change may also happen in a heavy perfectly normal traffic. However 
in a normal traffic the ratio of different types of packets is almost identical, no matter the traffic is 
heavy or light. But this ratio will change considerably in case of attack traffic. For example, if an 
attacker uses only the TCP Flood attack in a DDOS attack, the ratios of TCP ACK , TCP SYN 
and TCP (SYN+ACK) packets are not the same as these ratios in the normal situation. 
Therefore, other metrics are as follow:  
R(SYN): The ratio of SYN packets in TCP packets. 
R(ACK):: The ratio of ACK packets in TCP packets. 
R(SYN+ACK):: The ratio of (SYN + ACK) packets in TCP packets. 
We will use LTTng [87] for sampling and capturing information from traffics. The LTTng tracer 
(Linux Tracing Toolkit Next Generation) was expanded by DORSAL lab of Ecole Polytechnique 
de Montreal University. 
3.4.7 Number of packets per second (incoming and outgoing) 
The number of packets per second is another metric that will be collected in 2 parts, incoming 
and outgoing rate, in webserver virtual machine by using IPTraf tool similar to collecting I/O 
rate. As other researcher discused previously[86] the number of packet per second is a very 
common metric which sudenly change in case of DDoS and EDoS attacks.  
The number of packets in webserver will be suddenly increasing in HTTP attack but it is still not 
very different from a busy normal traffic. This amount will decrease in case of database attack 
but it is still not very different from a least busy normal traffic. The main difference in number of 
40 
 
packets is in TCP SYN Flood attack compared to a normal traffic. The number of packet in TCP 
SYN Flood attack suddenly increases significantly.  
3.4.8 Number of half-opened connections 
Number of half-opened connections is a very important metric that we will use specially for 
detecting TCP SYN Flood attack by using netstat command in Linux. 
We expect that the number of half- opened connections in HTTP attack and database attack will 
be almost the same as the normal situation. But this parameter will suddenly increase in case of 
TCP SYN Flood attack [2]. In TCP SYN Flood, attackers send a huge number of SYN packets to 
victim and also they don’t answer to ACK packet which is sent by the server (victim); so the 
three-way handshake cannot be completed and connection is released without completion. Thus 
we will have a huge number of half –opened connections in which SYN+ACK packet is lost. 
3.5 Change Point Detection algorithm: CUSUM  
For analyzing time ordered data to determine whether a change has taken place a change-point 
analysis can be performed using CUSUM algorithm [88, 89]. In our project we have used a 
procedure introduced by Taylor[89] in which a combination of cumulative sum charts (CUSUM) 
and bootstrapping is used to detect the changes.   
The first step in this analysis is to create the CUSUM chart based on a cumulative sum of the data. 
For n data points represented by Y1, Y2, …, Yn (Yi represents the data point i)  the cumulative 
sums S0, S1, …, Sn are calculated from the average of data. The cumulative sum starts at 0 by 
setting S0 = 0. Then we calculate the other cumulative sums by adding the difference between 
current value and the average to the previous sum as follows:  
                 ̅̅ ̅ )         (2) 
for 
i = 1, 2, …, n. 
Where  ̅ is the average of n data:  
   ̅̅ ̅  
∑   
 
   
 
       (3) 
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The cumulative sums calculated in this method are different from the normal cumulative sums of 
the values. In this method we consider the cumulative sums of variances between the values and 
the average. This cumulative sum always terminates at zero (Sn=0) because variances between 
the values and the average sum to zero.  
By plotting the CUSUM chart we can get some ideas as to whether or not a change has been 
occurred. When the CUSUM chart has an upward slope the values lean toward above the overall 
average. A downward slope is related to a period of time where the values lean toward below the 
overall average.  A sudden shift or change in the average can be detected by a sudden change in 
direction of the CUSUM.  If the average is constant CUSUM chart follows a relatively straight 
path.  
To be rest assured about the changes a bootstrap analysis can be performed to determine a 
confidence level for the apparent changes.  But first we need “an estimator of the magnitude of 
the change”.  Sdiff which is the difference between Smax and Smin is a good choice in this case as it 
works well for any distribution and multiple changes. Sdiff is calculated as: 
                    where: 
                      {
       a       i    . . . n 
        in      i    . . . n  
                (4) 
To perform a single bootstrap the procedure is as follow: 
1. First the original n values are randomly reordered to create a bootstrap sample of n units, 
denoted as Y
0
1, Y
0
2, …, Y
0
n,.   
2. The bootstrap CUSUM will be calculated for the new bootstrap sample as S00, S
0
1, …, S
0
n  
3. The maximum, minimum and difference of the bootstrap CUSUM will be calculated as 
S
0
max, S
0
min, and S
0
diff  respectively. 
4. The bootstrap difference will be compared with the original difference to define if the 
bootstrap difference S
0
diff is less than the original difference Sdiff. 
Bootstrapping analysis is based on the fact that if no change has taken place bootstrap samples 
(which represent random reorderings of the data) would copy the behavior of the CUSUM. 
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Accordingly, a large number of bootstraps will be performed and the number of bootstraps for 
which S
0
diff is less than Sdiff will be counted. The confidence level (as a percentage) of a change 
occurrence can be calculated as follows: 
Confidence Level =  100 
 
 
 %           (5) 
Where M is the number of performed bootstraps and P is  the number of bootstraps for which 
S
0
diff < Sdiff. 
Normally if the confidence level is about 90%, or 95% we can conclude the detection of a 
significant change.  For n samples the total number of possible reorderings is n!.  In a bootstrap 
analysis we estimate the distribution of S
0
diff  by randomly selecting 1000 of these possible 
reorderings. It has been proven that 1000 bootstraps is ample in most cases.  
After detecting a change, the CUSUM estimator can be used to estimate when the change 
happened. If the change occurred at k , then: 
|Sk|  =  max |Si| for i=1...n        (6) 
Sk is the furthest point from zero in the CUSUM chart.  k is the last point before the change and 
k+1 is the first point after the change. 
To detect multiple changes, after detecting the first change, the data is split into two parts, in two 
sides of the change-point, and each part is analyzed separately. The splitting procedure will 
continue for any additional significant change.  
In order to identify whether the detected change point is more than normal situation or less than 
the normal situation we use α  as the slope of change point chart between k (change point) and k-
1 (the point before change point). α can be calculated as follow: 
   
        
       
              (7) 
In equation7, α > 0 means the chart of CUSUM has an upward slope and indicates that k is a 
change point with a value less than normal situation (sudden decrease). Likewise α < 0 indicates 
a downward slope in CUSUM chart and therefore k is a change pointe with a value more than 
normal situation (sudden increase). 
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3.6 Proposed algorithm to detect different types of DDoS and EDoS 
attacks 
In this section, we propose an algorithm to detect different types of attacks (HTTP attack, 
Database attack and TCP SYN Flood attack) by using those metrics that we named in the last 
section. This algorithm works based on a state parameter, addressed as Stp in the following 
subtitles, where t is the type of attack (Http attack, Database attack or TCP SYN Flood) and p 
represents the sign p in each attack. The state of each attack and the detail of our algorithm will 
be explained in the following sections for Http attack, Database attack and SYN Flood attack 
situation. Later on we combine all the states of three types of attack and check all of them using 
their state parameters in our algorithm to provide the probability of each attack. But first we need 
to understand how we can determine the value of state parameters in each attack.  
3.6.1 Http attack sings 
When a virtual machine applies for more resources and sends its requests to the hypervisor, 
hypervisor must analyze the VM which sent requests and VMs which communicated with that 
VM and must then check the bellow states. If hypervisor finds the bellow states in the behavior of 
VMs, we have an Http attack in that VM and hypervisor should not allocate more resources to 
that VM. 
The Http attack signs are as follow: 
 Sign 1: TSP in Http attacks shows a sudden decrease. 
 Sign 2: IOWi in Http attacks is very larger than IODI. 
 Sign 3: IOWo in Http attacks is very larger than IODO. 
 Sign 4: CPUW in Http attacks is very larger than CPUD. 
 Sign 5: NBWph in Http attacks shows a sudden increase. 
 Sign 6: NBWpd in Http attacks shows a sudden increase. 
 Sign 7: NBWpw in Http attacks shows a sudden increase. 
 Sign 8: NBWpm in Http attacks shows a sudden increase. 
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The State parameter for the sign p in this attack is defined as S Http, p. For the sign p in Http attack, 
S Http, p is equal to 1 if the sign meets and is equal to 0 if the sign doesn’t meet. 
3.6.2 Database attack signs 
Similar to Http attack, when a virtual machine applies for more resources and sends its requests 
to the hypervisor, hypervisor must inspect the VM which sent requests and VMs which 
communicated with that VM and must then check the bellow states. If hypervisor finds the 
bellow states in the behavior of VMs, we have a Database attack in that VM and hypervisor 
should not allocate more resources to that VM. The states that specify a Database attack is almost 
the opposite of the Http attack’s states. 
The Database attack signs are as follow: 
 Sign 1: TSP in Database attacks shows a sudden increase. 
 Sign 2: IOWi in Database attacks is very smaller than IODI. 
 Sign 3: IOWo in Database attacks is very smaller than IODO. 
 Sign 4: CPUW in Database attacks is very smaller than CPUD. 
The State parameter for the sign p in this attack is defined as S Database, p. For the sign p in 
Database attack, S Database, p is equal to 1 if the sign meets and is equal to 0 if the sign doesn’t 
meet. 
3.6.3 TCP SYN Flood attack signs 
Similar to last two sections, there are some states that should be checked by hypervisor in case of 
TCP SYN Flood attacks. Some of the bellow metrics are retrieved from the literatures and some 
of them have been identified during our testing and network traffic analyzing as will be explained 
in details in chapter (4). 
The TCP SYN Flooding attack signs are as follow:  
 Sign 1: MemW in TCP SYN Flood attacks shows a sudden increase. 
 Sign 2: In our testing and samples analyzing we understood that R(SYN), R(ACK) and 
R(SYN+ACK) are somehow related to each other in case of SYN Flood attacks and 
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normal situation as we have shown in table 1;  where T. specifies that the relation is valid 
and F. indicates that the relation is not valid. 
 Sign 3: NPi in TCP SYN Flood attacks shows a sudden increase. 
 Sign 4: NPo in TCP SYN Flood attacks shows a sudden increase. 
 Sign 5:NHOP in TCP SYN Flood attacks shows a sudden increase. 
The State parameters in this attack will be defined according to the following procedure: 
 The state parameter of Sign 1 in TCP SYN Flooding attack, S TCP SYN Flooding, 1 is equal to 1 
if the sign meets and is equal to 0 if the sign doesn’t meet.  
 The state parameter of Sign 2 in TCP SYN Flooding attack, S TCP SYN Flooding, 2 is defined as 
shown in table 3.1.  
 The state parameter of Sign 3 in TCP SYN Flooding attack, S TCP SYN Flooding, 3 is equal to 1 
if the sign meets and is equal to 0 if the sign doesn’t meet.  
 The state parameter of sign 4 in TCP SYN Flooding attack, S TCP SYN Flooding, 4 is equal to 1 
if the sign meets and is equal to 0 if the sign doesn’t meet.  
 The state parameter of sign 5 in TCP SYN Flooding attack, S TCP SYN Flooding, 5 is equal to 1 
if the sign meets and is equal to 0 if the sign doesn’t meet.  
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Table 3. 1:Relationship between R(SYN), R(ACK) and R(SYN+ACK) 
R(SYN)= 
2R(SYN+ACK) 
R(ACK)+R(SYN+ACK)= 
Total number of samples’ 
packet 
R(SYN)+ 
R(SYN+ACK) 
>=Total number 
of samples’ 
packet 
R(ACK)= 
R(SYN+ACK) 
Traffic 
Situation 
State 
Parameter 
T. T. F. F. 
High chance 
of Normal 
-3 
T. T. F. T. 
Medium 
chance of 
Normal 
-2 
T. T. T. F. 
Medium 
chance of 
Normal 
-2 
T. F. F. F. 
Low chance 
of Normal 
-1 
F. T. F. F. 
Low chance 
of Normal 
-1 
F. F. T. T. 
High chance 
of Attack 
3 
F. T. T. T. 
Medium 
chance of 
Attack 
2 
T. F. T. T. 
Medium 
chance of 
Attack 
2 
F. F. F. T. 
Low chance 
of Attack 
1 
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Table 3. 1:Relationship between R(SYN), R(ACK) and R(SYN+ACK)(cont’d) 
F. F. T. F. 
Low chance 
of Attack 
1 
T. T. T. T. Unknown 0 
F. F. F. F. Unknown 0 
T. F. T. F. Unknown 0 
F. T. T. F. Unknown 0 
T. F. F. T. Unknown 0 
T. F. F. T. Unknown 0 
 
Table 3.1 shows the relationship between R(SYN), R(ACK), R(SYN+ACK). The first two 
columns (columns 1,2) represent this relationship in an ideal normal situation and the next two 
columns (columns 3,4) are representing this relationship in an ideal attack situation. A negative 
state parameter means that this parameter shifts the traffic to a normal one and therefore it 
decreases the probability of the attack.  
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3.6.4 Detecting changes by using CUSUM algorithm:  
In this work, we will use CUSUM to detect changes in TSP, MemW, NBWph, NBWpd, 
NBWpw, NBWpm, NPi, NPo, NHOP metrics. Then the signs that we explained in sections 3.6.1, 
3.6.2 and 3.6.3 will be considered to detect traffic situation. 
In this thesis “CUSUM_ Implementation” is a function that we employed to implement CUSUM. 
As you see in the bellow code, if  α > 0, this function returns value 0 and indicates that k is a 
change point with a value less than normal situation (sudden decrease) and if α < 0, it returns 
value 1 that means k is a change pointe with a value more than normal situation (sudden 
increase). 
CUSUM_Implementation : 
      ̅̅ ̅= average of Yi 
   S0=0 
   For i=1, i<= n, i++: 
            Si = Si-1 + (Yi -    ̅̅ ̅) 
  End For 
  Sdiff = SMax – Smin 
  For j=1, j<= 1000 , j++: 
              Y = boot strap of Y 
              S
0
0=0 
              For i=1, i<= n, i++: 
                       S
0
i= S
0
i-1 + (Yi -    ̅̅ ̅) 
            End For 
            S
0
diff = S
0
Max – S
0
Min 
               If   S
0
diff < Sdiff   then: 
                   m=m+1 
          End If          
  End For 
  If  
 
     
     >= 90 then: 
            |Sk| = Max |Si| 
               = 
        
       
 
             If     <= 0 then: 
                    Return 1 
           Else: 
                   Return 0 
          End If 
  End If 
  Print “there is no change point” 
 End CUSUM_Implementation 
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Then we give the values of TSP as input to CUSUM_Implementation to find and to detect any 
changes in TSP values. Thus we will have: 
      
So if the function returns value 0, it indicates that k is a change point with a TSP value less than 
normal situation (sudden decrease) and if the function returns value 1 that means k is a change 
pointe with a TSP value more than normal situation (sudden increase). Otherwise there is no 
significant change in TSP values. 
Afterward we will consider sign 1 in HTTP Attack, Database attack and will calculate S HTTP attack , 
1 and S Database attack , 1 . 
In the next step we give the values of MemW as input to CUSUM_Implementation to find and to 
detect any changes in MemW values. Thus we will have: 
   e   
So if the function returns value 0, it indicates that k is a change point with a MemW value less 
than normal situation (sudden decrease) and if the function returns value 1 that means k is a 
change pointe with a MemW value more than normal situation (sudden increase). Otherwise 
there is no significant change in MemW values. 
Subsequently we will consider sign 1 in TCP SYN Flood attack and will calculate S TCP SYN Flood ,1 
. 
Also we give the values of NBWph, NBWpd, NBWpw, NBWpm as input to 
CUSUM_Implementation to find and to detect any changes in NBWph, NBWpd, NBWpw, 
NBWpm values separately. We will use CUSUM_Implementation for each of these 4 metrics 
(NBWph, NBWpd, NBWpw, NBWpm) separately similar to what previously mentioned for TSP 
and MemW.  Therefore we have to run the function for 4 more times. For the first time we will 
have: 
     ph 
For the second time of running the function we will have: 
     pd 
For the third time we will have: 
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     p  
And finally for the fourth time we will have: 
     p  
In the first time if the function returns value 0, it indicates that k is a change point with a 
      value less than normal situation (sudden decrease)  and if the function returns value 1 
that means k is a change pointe with a       value more than normal situation (sudden 
increase). Otherwise there is no significant change in       values. Afterward we will 
consider sign 5 in HTTP attack and will calculate S HTTP attack ,5 . 
In the second time if the function returns value 0, it indicates that k is a change point with a 
      value less than normal situation (sudden decrease) and if the function returns value 1 
that means k is a change pointe with a       value more than normal situation (sudden 
increase). Otherwise there is no significant change in       values. Afterward we will 
consider sign 6 in HTTP attack and will calculate S HTTP attack ,6 . 
In the third time that we will implement the function, if it returns value 0, it shows the k is a 
change point with a       value less than normal situation (sudden decrease)  and if the 
function returns value 1 that means k is a change pointe with a       value more than normal 
situation (sudden increase). Otherwise there is no significant change in        values. 
Afterward we will consider sign 7 in HTTP attack and will calculate S HTTP attack ,7 . 
Finally in the fourth time if the function returns value 0, it indicates that k is a change point with 
a       value less than normal situation (sudden decrease) and if the function returns value 1 
that means k is a change pointe with a        value more than normal situation (sudden 
increase). Otherwise there is no significant change in       values. Afterward we will 
consider sign 8 in HTTP attack and will calculate S HTTP attack ,8 . 
In the next step we give the values of NPi and NPo as input to CUSUM_Implementation to find 
and to detect any changes in NPi and NPo values separately. We will run 
CUSUM_Implementation 2 times for 2 above metrics (NPi and NPo). Thus for the first time we 
will have:  
    i  
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And for the second time we will have: 
    o  
In the first time if the function returns value 0, it indicates that k is a change point with an NPi 
value less than normal situation (sudden decrease) and if the function returns value 1 that means 
k is a change pointe with an NPi value more than normal situation (sudden increase). Otherwise 
there is no significant change in NPi values. 
Afterward we will consider sign 3 in TCP SYN Flood attack and will calculate S TCP SYN Flood ,3 . 
In the second time if the function returns value 0, it indicates that k is a change point with an NPo 
value less than normal situation (sudden decrease) and if the function returns value 1 that means 
k is a change pointe with an NPo value more than normal situation (sudden increase). Otherwise 
there is no significant change in NPo values. Afterward we will consider sign 4 in TCP SYN 
Flood attack and will calculate S TCP SYN Flood ,4 . 
Finally we give the values of NHOP as input to CUSUM_Implementation to find and to detect 
any changes in NHOP values. Thus we will have: 
       
So if the function returns value 0, it indicates that k is a change point with a NHOP value less 
than normal situation (sudden decrease) and if the function returns value 1 that means k is a 
change pointe with a NHOP value more than normal situation (sudden increase). Otherwise there 
is no significant change in NHOP values. Afterward we will consider sign 5 in TCP SYN Flood 
attack and will calculate S TCP SYN Flood ,5 . 
3.6.5 Detecting attack percentage procedure 
As mentioned earlier, one of our contributions in this work is to detect different types of attack in 
one algorithm. To achieve this goal we need to combine the states of all three types of attack to 
provide a probability of each attack. The percentage of each attack is defined as follow: 
      
∑        
∑            
       (8) 
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Wt  is the percentage of the attack type t. For the attack t with n signs, Wt  is defined as the ratio 
of the sum of the real values of all n state parameters to the sum of the maximum values that n 
state parameters can have. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we proposed a novel and inclusive model for detecting different types of EDoS 
and DDoS attacks. In designing our model, we used the metrics related to all 3 types of attacks 
and consequently we could successfully introduce a global algorithm based on the metrics that 
previously introduced in previous works. This model works perfectly for all three of HTTP 
attack, Database attack and TCP SYN Flood attack no matter what time each attack happened. 
Therefore, instead of using three different algorithms for detecting these attacks, we are able to 
use a generalized algorithm. Furthermore, this precise detection is considered as a defense itself 
because the services will be provided only to VMs that are in Normal situation; therefore we 
prevent the migration of attacks from VM to the hypervisor. This is a temporary defense for the 
system till finding a permanent solution in the future. Moreover, we calculated an attack 
persentage value for each type of attack .The critical value of the attack percentage to make a 
decision depends on the sensitivity of the system. For more sensitive system, even attacks with 
low percentage causes limiting resources. 
In the next chapter we present our experiments and our results. Furthermore, we will compare our 
detection rate with privous works and will also evaluate our metrics in chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND DISCUTIONS 
As discussed earlier, the virtualization is the main concept of cloud computing and every service 
in cloud computing is located in a virtual machine. For example, the database is placed in one 
virtual machine and the web server is located in another virtual machine. Therefore when 
customers want to put their services in the cloud, they must order a set of VMs (we consider the 
infrastructure as a service). However, cloud computing system is a pay-as-you-go service, so 
customers have to pay for the amount of VM that they used. They can apply for more resources 
whenever they want. 
On the hypervisor side we can monitor all the events and the requests from each VM. In the 
proposed model, when a virtual machine applies for more resources and sends its requests to the 
hypervisor we can have a monitoring system to trace the VM kernel system and analyze the 
traffic. If the situation is normal, the resources are allocated to VM, but if an attack is detected in 
VM resources, the resources will not be allocated to VM and the live migration will be stopped. 
Based on this explanation, we allocate one VM to the web server and another VM to database 
server and try to extract metrics that have been explained in section 3.3. Finally, metrics of the 
new arrival traffic will be given to our model as input and the proposed model will detect the 
situation of this traffic. We are going to clarify in this chapter how to extract metrics of our 
model. At the end of this chapter we will discuss our detection results and compare our model 
with previous works in order to evaluate the performance of our proposed model. 
4.1  Set up for experimental result  
In this section we are going to explain how we did the experimental result where we hypothesize 
that the attacker is outside of the cloud. Another hypothesis in this scenario is that we know 
server of a big company is located in the Virtual machine in a cloud computing environment. At 
the first glance it may look like that the attack is similar to a traditional attack (attack in non-
virtualization environment); but in fact when a server is in VM, resources of this server are 
extendable and increasable. 
We used Qemu [90] (version 2.0.0-rc1) that is a common and open source machine emulator and 
virtualization machine to have VMs base on KVM. We considered one of the VMs as a 
webserver virtual machine and run a webserver on it. We used Httpd[91] version 2.2 that is 
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Apache HyperText Transfer Protocol program for server. Also we considered one other VM as a 
Database server (these two VMs (webserver and Database server) are as a server of a company). 
MySQL[92] version 5.6.16 that is the world's most popular open source database was used in this 
VM. 
Table 4.1 can show the detail of physical machine and VMs configurations that used in this work. 
 4.1: System details 
 Memory CPU 
Physical Machine 7.7 GiB Intel core2 Quad CPU Q6700 @2.66 GHz × 4 
Virtual Machines 2.0 GiB QEMU Virtual CPU version 1.0 × 2 
 
In the next step we consider some customers for this company and generate some normal traffics 
from customers to server by using netsniff-ng toolkit [93] that can generate a normal traffic. We 
used trafgen command to generate normal packets and configured it to send 20000 packets as 
normal traffic for first time. We changed the amount of packets in different test times. 
In the next Phase we implemented TCP SYN Flood attack by using hping3 tool [94, 95]. We 
used hping3 -c command to generate TCP SYN Flood packets and configured it to send 1000000 
packets as TCP SYN Flood traffic. We increase this amount of packets for performing more 
power attack in next test times. 
In the next steps we performed Http attack and Data base attack separately by using 
HTTPFlooder [96] and LoadRunner [97], consecutively. It is possible to create Http attack by 
using httpflooder command and use appropriate key for generate arbitrary attacks ( for example 
GF is a key for generating Get Flood attacks and PF is a key for generating Post Flood attacks). 
In the next step we configured LoadRunner tool for generate more load to database server and 
assumed it as a Database attack. 
Afterwards, we needed some tools for capturing the sample from traffics that generated in the last 
steps and for monitoring resources too. 
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We measured Network I/O and the number of packets per second by using IPTraf which is a tool 
for monitoring network statistics. Also vnstat is used for measuring the different amount of 
bandwidth usage. Memory usage and CPU usage is monitored by using Top command. The 
command that we used for monitoring the number of half open-conections was netstat. 
Moreover, We used LTTng (Linux Tracing Toolkit Next Generation) [87] for sampling and 
capturing Packet information from traffics.  
In continue, we explain how we got the samples and analyse the information from traffic and 
resourse usage in more details. 
4.2  Time Spent on a Web Page (TSP) 
We used Time Spent on a Web Page (TSP) which has been previously presented by Koduru et 
al.[81]. The TSP is calculated by using equation (1). On the other hand any sudden changes in the 
calculated TSP are detected by using CUSUM method. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the values of 
TSP in different numbers of test and the results of implementing CUSUM for TSP in Http attack 
and database attack respectively. 
Figure  4.1: variation of TSP values (left) and CUSUM values in TSP(right) in Http attack 
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Figure  4.2: variation of TSP values (left) and CUSUM values in TSP(right) in Database attack 
 
As it is clearly shown in the above figures, detecting change points in left pictures is almost 
impossible, but in right pictures it is very easy to detect change points.  
Similarly, there is a change point in figure 4.1 (right) between number of test 12 and 13. Also 
since the slope of CUSUM chart before this point (number of test 12) is upward so we have a 
change point with a value less than normal situation in Http attack (sudden decrease). 
In case of Database attack, a change has occurred in figure 4.2 between number of test 11 and 13. 
In this time, there is an downward slope before this point in CUSUM chart for Database attack so 
we have a change point with a value more than normal situation (sudden increase). 
4.3 Network I/O in webserver virtual machine and Database virtual 
machine 
We measured Network I/O in Webserver virtual machine by using IPTraf which is a tool for 
monitoring network statistics. As you see in Figure  4.3, we collected incoming rate and outgoing 
rate of network I/O in our webserver virtual machine. I/O in database VM is also measured in a 
similar way by using IPTraf  tool.  
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Figure  4.3 : I/O usage in webserver virtual machine in normal situation by using IPTraf 
 
Figure 4.4 shows different amounts of network I/O for webserver virtual machine and database 
virtual machine in normal, HTTP attack, Database attack and TCP SYN Flood situations. 
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Figure  4.4:Different amount of network I/O in different situation 
4.4 Percent CPU usage in webserver virtual machine and database 
virtual machine 
The CPU usage data has been collected according to the proposed method by Shea et al. [54]. 
There are a lot of tools and commands in Linux to collect CPU usage. We used the Top 
command on the hypervisor side for this task because in this command we can monitor CPU 
usage per each VM separately. Figure 4.5 demonstrates our results obtained using the Top 
command in the hypervisor. CPU usage per each VM (VM1 and VM2) is observed in this figure. 
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Figure  4.5 : CPU usage 
 
Figure 4.6 shows different amounts of CPU usage in webserver virtual machine and database 
virtual machine in normal, HTTP attack, Database attack and TCP SYN Flood situations. 
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Figure  4.6:CPU usage in different situation 
4.5 Memory usage in webserver virtual machine 
Memory usage in webserver which is another metric of our work can be collected by using the 
Top command in the hypervisor similar to CPU usage which had been shown in Figure 4.5.  In 
order to compare this value with normal situation and detect any sudden changes in memory 
usage, we implement attacks and normal traffic in our system. Memory usage in webserver is 
compared with normal situation each time by using CUSUM method. Figures 4.7 shows the 
values of Memory usage (MemW) in different numbers of test and the result of implementing 
CUSUM for MemW in TCP SYN Flood attack.  
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Figure  4.7: variation of MemW values (left) and CUSUM values in MemW (right) in TCP SYN Flood attack 
 
As it is clear in the above figure, detecting change points in the left picture is very difficult, but in 
the right picture it is very easy to detect the change point. A sudden change happened in figure 
4.7 (right) between number of test 12 and 13. Also since the slope of  CUSUM chart before this 
point (number of test 12) is downward so we have a change point with a value more than normal 
situation in case of TCP SYN Flood attack (sudden increase). 
There is no significant change point in Http attack and Data base attack compared to normal 
situation. 
4.6 Network bandwidth in webserver 
As mentioned earlier, we ran a web server on a virtual machine and tried to connect to this server 
from other computers. We captured the bandwidth usage in the webserver virtual machine on the 
hypervisor side. To have a complete and thorough detection, extensive and comprehensive 
information was required; therefore, we measured the bandwidth usage per hour, day, week and 
month by using vnstat as you can see in Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9, Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 
respectively. 
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Figure  4.8 : Bandwidth usage per hour 
In the table shown in Figure 4.8, rx represents the download traffic and tx means the upload 
traffic. As you can see in this figure, the usage of the bandwidth for rx is between 98,683 KB and 
2,126,507 KB and for tx is between 3,131 KB and 48,685 KB during this specific day. 
Consequently, almost the busiest hour is 2 pm and the least busy hour is 9 pm in one sample day 
of our web server. Figure 4.8 also shows a diagram demonstrating the ratio of bandwidth usage 
per hour. 
Figure  4.9 : Bandwidth usage per day for an 8-day period (from 06/26/2014 to 07/03/2014) 
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As you see in Figure 4.9 the busiest day and the least busy day in a sample 8-day period of our 
web server (from 06/26/2014 to 07/03/2014) are 07/03/2014 and 06/29/2014 respectively. 
Figure  4.10 : Bandwidth usage per week 
The busiest and the least busy weeks are shown in the Figure 4.10 in a sample 2-weeks period of 
our web server. 
Figure  4.11 : Bandwidth usage per month 
Figure 4.11 shows the bandwidth usage in June, July, August and September 2014. 
New arrival traffic should be checked with normal situation to detect a change point in one of the 
above terms (NBWph, NBWpd, NBWpw, NBWpm). 
Figures 4.12,4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 present the values of these metrics in different numbers of test 
and the results of implementing CUSUM for detecting change points in Http attack.  
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Figure  4.12: variation of NBWph values (left) and CUSUM values in NBWph (right) in Http attack 
 
As it is clear in figure 4.12 (right) a sudden change happened between number of test 12 and 14 
in Http attack situation. 
 
Figure  4.13: variation of NBWpd values (left) and CUSUM values in NBWpd (right) in Http attack 
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Figure  4.14:variation of  NBWpw values (left) and CUSUM values in NBWpw(right) in Http attack 
 
Figure  4.15: variation of NBWpm values(left) and CUSUM values in NBWpm(right) in Http attack 
In figure 4.13(right), we can see multiple change points; but as we discussed in chapter 3, 
modulus of maximum amount of change (max |Si|) will be considered. So in number of test 12 we 
have the maximum amount of change.  
Also it is clear in figure 4.14 (right) that a sudden change happened between number of test 12 
and 13 in Http attack situation. 
In figure 4.15 (right), modulus of maximum amount of change is in number of test 12. 
4.7 Packet information 
We used LTTng [87] for sampling  and capturing information from traffics. As you can see in 
Figure 4.16, we could successfully capture the information about flags of many packets in one 
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sample of the traffic. We analysed these flags and extracted R(SYN), R(ACK) and 
R(SYN+ACK). 
Figure  4.16 : packets information using LTTng 
For example as you see in Figure 4.16, the first value of flags is 5002. This number is in 
hexadecimal format. We first changed it to the binary format and then analyzed it using the TCP 
header table presented in Figure 4.17. There are 9 bits (from 7 to 15) in the TCP header that 
indicate the flag information. The most important bits for us are ACK (bit 11) and SYN (bit 14). 
We extracted these information from packets and calculated R(SYN), R(ACK) and 
R(SYN+ACK). In the above example, the first value of flags indicates that the value of SYN is 
equal to1 and the value of ACK is equal to 0, so this packet is a SYN packet. 
67 
 
Figure  4.17 : TCP Header[98] 
 
4.8 Number of packets per second (incoming and outgoing) 
Number of packets per second is another metric which is collected by IPTraf tool similar to 
collecting I/O rate as presented in figure 4.3. As we mentioned earlier, Number of packets has 
been collected in 2 parts, incoming rate and outgoing rate, in webserver virtual machine. 
Figures 4.18 and 4.19 show the values of these metrics in different numbers of test and the results 
of implementing CUSUM that used for detecting change points in TCP SYN Flood attack.  
It is completely clear that we have a change point in the number of test 12 in both figures 4.18 
and 4.19.  
Figure  4.18: variation of NPi values (left) and CUSUM values in NPi(right) in TCP SYN Flood attack   
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Figure  4.19: variation of NPo values (left) and CUSUM values in NPo(right) in TCP SYN Flood attack 
 
4.9 Number of half-opened connections 
The number of half opened connections is measured by using netstat command in Linux as you 
can see in Figure 4.20. 
Figure  4.20 : number of half-opened connection by use of netstat 
As expected, and according to our results in different tests by netstat, the number of SYN-RECV 
which is representative of half opened connection in Linux [2] in HTTP attack and database 
attack are almost the same as the normal situation. But this parameter shows a sudden increase in 
case of TCP SYN Flood attack. 
Figure 4.21(right) indicates this change in TCP SYN Flood attack in number of test 12 clearly. 
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Figure  4.21: variation of NHOP values(left) and CUSUM values in NHOP(right) in TCP SYN Flood attack. 
4.10 Evaluation and discussion 
As discussed earlier, when VMs need more resources (Memory, CPU, Network bandwidth, etc.) 
they send their requests to hypervisor for increasing the resources and hypervisor allocates the 
required resources to these VMs; if the hypervisor doesn’t have enough resources VM migrates 
to another hypervisor. We put our framework in the middle of this process so when a request was 
sent from VMs, this request is first received by our Traffic Statistic Computation & Measurement 
part. The task of this part is to extract metrics of all VMs which are in connection with the 
desired VM. Afterwards, the results generated by Traffic Statistic Computation & Measurement 
part (TSP, IOWi,…), will be sent to Detecting Unit where our proposed detecting algorithm can 
detect what the situation of new arrival traffic is and can calculate percentage of each type of 
attack as well (Figure 3.1). 
Based on the result of this detection, if one of the three attacks is detected with a high percentage, 
allocating the resources will be limited otherwise resources will be allocated to VM. The critical 
value of the attack percentage to make a decision depends on the sensitivity of the system. For 
more sensitive system, even attacks with low percentage causes limiting resources. 
In this chapter we evaluate our system using 2 criteria: Metric and accuracy; that we are going to 
explain in the following sections: 
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4.10.1 Accuracy evaluation 
In order to evaluate the accuracy of our algorithm, we tested our detecting model and compared it 
with previous works. For this purpose, we choose Snort[99]. Snort is a free and open source IDS 
(intrusion detection system)  which can perform real-time traffic analysis and detect the attacks 
[100]. The result showed that our model work with higher rate of correct detection compared to 
previous IDS like Snort. Figure 4.22 shows the result of comparison between the rate of correct 
detection in our model and in snort IDS. 
Figure  4.22: rate of correct detection comparison 
As it is clear in figure 4.22, the rate of correct detection in our model in average is about 85 % 
approximately. However, the average of rate of correct detection in snort is 70% approximately. 
In view of the above result we can conclude that the accuracy of our detection model is reliable 
and very well acceptable.  
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4.10.2 Metrics evaluation 
As mentioned earlier, we used all the metrics of different types of attack for detecting each type 
of attack in our framework.  It means that the metrics of one kind of attack play an important role 
to detect another type and vice versa. In order to evaluate the performance of our detection 
model, we compared our framework efficiency with algorithms that use only the special metrics 
of one attack to detect that attack without considering the metrics of other attacks. We named 
these three algorithms A1, A2 and A3 as follow: 
 A1: Algorithms which detect HTTP attacks based on specific metrics of HTTP attacks.  
 A2: Algorithms which detect TCP SYN flood attacks based on specific metrics of TCP 
SYN flood attacks. 
 A3: Algorithms which detect Database attacks based on specific metrics of Database 
attacks. 
In order to evaluate the efficiency of our metrics we need to test and compare them with A1, A2 
and A3 without performing our detection model. One option is using a machine learning 
algorithm for evaluating our metrics. We are going to see how much the percentage of correctly 
classify traffic is when a machine learning algorithm uses our metrics and compare it with the 
cases that the machine learning algorithm uses A1, A2 or A3 metrics. 
For this purpose, we have selected a popular machine learning algorithm called Neural Network. 
This algorithm has been widely used in previous works in security concept specially in DDOS 
attack in both cloud computing[101, 102] and old network (non- virtualization systems)[103]. 
WEKA tool has been used to implement Neural Network. WEKA is a machine learning 
workbench which helps to use different machine learning algorithms for different real-word 
problems [104]. MultilayerPerceptron is a function in WEKA which represents Neural Network. 
We have configured Neural Network and trained it by a set of samples (65% of our data) which 
all include the previously explained 18 metrics (TSP,IODi,…,NHOP). Afterward, we have tested 
the algorithm using the rest of samples (35% of our data) which all include 18 metrics as well. 
As a result, Neural Network could precisely classify traffic where 97.06% of traffic has been 
correctly classified and only 2.94 % has been incorrectly classified. Figure 4.23 demonstrates the 
result of our testing by Neural Network.  
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Figure  4.23: Testing our framework metrics by Neural Network 
 
We perform neural network configuration again based on A1 metrics, A2 metrics and A3 metrics 
separately. Then we compared neural network classification based on our metrics and based on 
A1, A2 and A3 metrics. Figure 4.24 shows the result of this comparison. 
73 
 
           
Figure  4.24 : Evaluating our metrics by using Neural network 
 
As it’s shown in Figure 4.24 our metrics have a tremendously higher percentage of correctly 
classified attacks and a much lower percentage of incorrectly classified attack. This test by 
Neural Network with 97.06 % correct classification rate can prove that we have chosen proper 
and effective metrics.  
Furthermore, our first and obvious advantage of our model is that we are able to detect every 3 
types of attacks in our framework while other algorithms can detect only one type of attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION  
In the frame of this thesis, we discussed about security which is a big concern in cloud 
computing. We investigated DDoS attacks and a specific type of these attacks which is called 
TCP SYN flooding attacks. These are common and popular attacks in cloud computing. EDoS 
which is a new and exceptional type of DDoS attack can also influence Cloud through a DDoS 
and can make economic problem for cloud costumer and provider. We investigated Http attack 
and Database attack as special types of EDoS and DDoS attacks. In order to successfully confront 
the attack and to be able to prevent the system against it the most important step is to design a 
reliable and powerful framework for attack detection. 
As it was shown in the literature review, there are a lot of algorithms in traditional (non-
virtualization) system for detecting DDoS attacks which work well in non-virtualization system. 
However, these algorithms are useless in cloud environment if we don’t apply the required 
modification. 
On the other hand, the majority of existing algorithms for detecting DDoS attacks in cloud 
computing environment work based on packet information. Since the packet in DDoS attack is 
identical to packet in the normal situation, these algorithms are not reliable enough for DDoS 
detection. 
Also, the current algorithms for EDoS attacks are useful only for one attack and to our best 
knowledge there is not any global model to detect all types of attacks. Moreover, they have 
mainly focused only on finding a solution for the defense and mitigation of EDoS attacks in 
cloud computing.  
In this work we proposed a novel and inclusive model for detecting different types of EDoS and 
DDoS attacks. We used HTTP attack as a good representative of the Bandwidth – Consuming 
EDoS attacks. To address EDoS as an "Attack that targets specific applications" we considered 
Database as the targeted application. Moreover, as a delegate for connection–layer exhaustion 
attacks, we nominated TCP SYN Flood attack. At the next step, we collected features which are 
related to traffic and resource usage in each attack. These features formed the metrics of our 
detection model. In designing our model, we used the metrics related to all 3 types of attacks and 
consequently we could successfully introduce a global and inclusive algorithm which worked 
perfectly for all three of HTTP attack, Database attack and TCP SYN Flood attack no matter 
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what time each attack happened. Therefore, instead of using three different algorithms for 
detecting these attacks, we are able to use a generalized algorithm.  
The accuracy of our algorithm was then investigated by comparing its performance with Snort. 
Achieving a higher rate of correct detection in our model proved the high accuracy of the 
designed algorithm. 
In order to evaluate the efficiency of our model’s metrics we compared them with the metrics of 
other algorithms which considered only one type of attack; however, this needed to be done 
without performing our detection model. For this purpose, we used Neural Network that has been 
widely used in previous works in security concept in cloud computing. The result showed that 
our metrics have a tremendously higher percentage of correctly classified attacks and a much 
lower percentage of incorrectly classified attacks. Thus using this global algorithm is much more 
efficient in detecting the attacks compared to using three separate algorithms since metrics of one 
kind of attack plays an important role to detect another type. 
Furthermore, this precise detection can be considered as a defense itself because the services will 
be provided only to VMs that are in Normal situation; therefore we prevent the migration of 
attacks from VM to the hypervisor. This is a temporary defense for the system till finding a 
permanent solution in the future.  
Although our algorithm is highly reliable and extremely accurate in detecting all three mentioned 
attacks, it has a limitation. If the Database attack and Http attack occur simultaneously in the 
system, the traffic and resource usage are very similar to heavy and busy traffic in the normal 
situation. Therefore the accuracy of detection will degrade in this case. However, the possibility 
of having these two attacks concurrently in the system is very low and almost negligible and 
that’s why we ignored this situation in our assumptions. 
This work can be further expanded to find features for other attacks in addition to HTTP attack, 
Database attack and TCP SYN Flood. A very interesting elaboration to this work would be to 
allocate weights to the metrics and then to design a machine learning algorithm that can 
automatically predict and detect other types of attacks using this expanded model. 
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